



Sensitised Police For Empowered Society

Dr. B.N. Ramesh belongs to the Indian Police Service of 1988 batch (R.R.) of West Bengal cadre. An engineer by profession he worked for Tata Motors for four years. He did his MBA from IIM-C and Ph.D from IIT-Kgp. He was Addtl. S.P. Barrackpore, S.P. of Burdwan Dt and 24 Paraganas (North). He was S.P. Operations, Medinipore Dt. He was D.I.G. of all the three ranges of north Bengal and handled the Greater Cooch Behar agitation successfully and has vast experience in tackling law and order, insurgency, criminal investigation and anti-terrorist operations in West Bengal. On deputation to C.R.P.F initially as D.I.G. Operations, he handled anti-Maoist operations in A.P. and later as I.G.P. he handled the Chattisgarh based anti-Maoist operations (from August 2010 onwards). He handled the sensitive Kashmir Valley (Oct. 2010-12) and played an instrumental role in bringing back normalcy to the Kashmir Valley.

Dr. Ramesh has been awarded the Police Medal for meritorious service, Parakram Medal, D.G. C.R.P.F. discs in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. He also received the prestigious INDIAN ARMY's Commendation Disc for excellent operational performance in Kashmir Valley for the years 2011-2012. He received cash rewards from Ministry of Finance for anti smuggling operations and from Govt. J&K for anti terrorist operations.

Dr. Ramesh has delivered lectures at IIM-A, IDSA, LBSIM-New Delhi, ISA-Mt. Abu, Delhi Judiciary Academy, NPA-Hyderabad. He chaired two International Conferences at IISc-Bengaluru on theme of Governance and at CII New Delhi on theme of Internal Security and presented papers at International Conferences organized by RGNVIT-Tamil Nadu and Deakin University Australia/Central University Hyderabad at Hyderabad on themes of Migration, Political Parties, Governance and Democracy and contributed papers at National Conferences on Security, Governance, Sustainable Development.

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Training Needs of Police Personnel in Naxal Prone Areas

Dr. Boppudi Naga Ramesh



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Left Wing Extremist political challenges to India's internal security are as old as India's independence. However these challenges took violent turn, first during the Naxalite movement in the late 1960s and latter under the Maoist movement from the year 2004. It was not uncommon that every month, at one place or other there were encounters, deaths, blasts and attacks on policemen, police stations, camps etc. The worst attack so far was the incident of Chintalnar, in April 2010 when a Company of CRPF was wiped out. There is a need to understand the pattern behind these attacks, do a SWOT analysis and prepare the policemen and officers accordingly.

The author was assigned, under NPA fellowship programme, the task of conducting training needs analysis and this book is the abridged version of the report. The author hopes to revise the contents periodically by incorporating the macro - macro changes in the LWE related security scenario in the days to come. The author would like to inform the readers that, he implemented what he learnt, in a customized way in Kashmir and there has not a single casualty during his 2-year tenure in Kashmir (October 2010 to October 2012) as IG Operations.

The author gratefully acknowledges the help he received from Shri V.N. Rai, IPS, Director NPA, Dr. Anil Saxena, Professor, Management Studies and Shri K. Vijay Kumar, IPS, the then Director, NPA.

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by Dr. Boppudi Naga Ramesh

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Foreword

Training is regarded as one of the greatest investments in the development of human resources. Identification of training needs, formulation of course design, implementation and evaluation of training are the basic steps of the training process.

Dr Ramesh has attempted a research study on Training Needs Analysis of Police Personnel deployed in the naxalite prone areas of our country. Besides visits to the naxalite areas, structured interviews and brainstorming an excellent research methodology in the form of analysis of critical incidents of naxalite menace was done for working out the training needs in a much needed area.

His research study is being brought-out in a book form by the SVP National Police Academy for effective and speedy dissemination of research findings to the Training Institutions, field units and the policy makers. Based on identified training needs, Dr. Ramesh has recommended the course designs for various ranks engaged in the naxalite prone areas. Methodology of training is also suggested by him.

This book is more of referential nature and will certainly provide TNA methodology based on the real time analysis of critical incidents.

V.N. Rai, IPS
Director
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1

Left Wing Extremism and Internal Security

Casualties of Police Personnel in the Left-Wing Extremist (LWE) prone/controlled areas of India, both in terms of death and injuries bring out the urgent need of preparatory training of Police Personnel for facing the challenges posed by the LWE practitioners, also called Maoist/Naxalites. Systematic analysis of training needs of police personnel requires an incisive look at -

- the capabilities for addressing the challenges to India's Internal Security by the left wing extremists
- the Inventory of current training input in different states of the LWE theatre and
- the ways and means of addressing the gaps.

This approach, in other words, require a study of the nature and type of internal security (IS) challenges the Maoist pose, their ideology, strategy and tactics.

1.1 Lwe Challenges to Internal Security in India

The Communist Party of India (CPI) was established in the early 1920's at Moscow in line with the principles of COMINTRON i.e. Communist International under the early Communist Leaders like P.C. Joshi, having been influenced by the success of Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, otherwise known as the October Revolution. The main agenda

of the CPI was to forge a working class unity and to fight for the rights of workers and peasants against Capitalist-Imperialist combine. The ideology of CPI was influenced by Marxism and their strategy and the tactics were totally modelled on Lenin's theory of Party and State.

CPI continued its independent movements on land, on trade union front, on peasant front and in the mid 1940's CPI led the first armed revolution among the peasants in the "*Telangana Ryot wari*" following uprising against the then Nizam of Hyderabad State.

Post 1947, their armed struggle continued against Razakars of Nizam in the entire Telangana till the accession of Hyderabad state with the Union of India under the initiative of Sardar Patel, the first Home Minister of India. The Telangana Movement taught the CPI activists the first principles of guerrilla war which they later converted into a fine art and the worst manifestation of the same was displayed on the 6th of April, 2010 when the Maoist wiped out one entire company of CRPF at Chintalnar in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh.

1.2 C.P.I. and Independent India

C.P.I. participated in democratic elections and sent MLA's/MP's to Regional and National Legislatures. They have a strong following in areas like West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Bihar, Punjab and CPI was the main opposition party to Congress in the above states till the Nehru era which ended in the year 1964. The year 1964 is important because of the split of CPI and the emergence of C.P.I. (Marxist), a Pro-Chinese Communist Party Faction. In the words of authors like Manoranjan Mohanty of Delhi University, this split was a factional split whereas the later day splits were ideological splits. The Sino-Soviet Schism and its impact on India's foreign policy, the 1962 Chinese aggression on India and the Pro-Russian stance of C.P.I. all together contributed to the split and the radical elements of Bengal and A.P. formed the CPI-Marxist in 1964. Their leaders were prominent Communists like P. Sundarayya, M.Basava Punniiah, B.T. Ranadive, Charu

Mazumdar, Saroj Mukherjee, Jyoti Basu, Binoy Chowdhury, Hare Krishna Konar while C.P.I was led by C.Rajeshwara Rao, S.A. Dange, Mohit Sen and others.

Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal of North Bengal led armed peasant rebellions in Naxalbari subdivision of Darjeeling district of West Bengal and due to defiance of party's directive, they both came out and formed another faction called CPI Marxist-Leninist i.e C.P.I. (M-L). Charu Mazumdar first articulated the difference between Andhra Line and Bengal Line and the Naxalite movement started from a nondescript Naxalbari and spread to Calcutta (Kolkata) in the 1970's and the movement was crushed by the late Siddhartha Shankar Roy, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal in 1971. However, by the year 1969, the Naxal movement of West Bengal was customized to Andhra Pradesh through the Srikakulam armed uprising in the Northern Coastal areas of Andhra Pradesh in Srikakulam-Vishakhapatnam areas of Andhra Pradesh. Andhra Pradesh Naxalite movement was led by Tarimela Nagi Reddy, Kondapalli Seetha Ramaiah, Adibhatla Kailasam, Vempatapu Satyam among others. It was the class annihilation which was the crux of difference between Andhra Pradesh Naxals and Bengal Naxals. It took lot of time to control the movement in Andhra Pradesh whereas it took a couple of years to crush the Bengal Naxal.

While in 1964, the split was more of a factional split, the 1967 split and further splintering was one of ideological nature. There were splits like Pro-Lin-Piao and Anti-Lin-Piao, Pro-Charu Mazumdar, Anti-Charu Mazumdar and at one time there were more than 36 splinter groups among C.P.I. (M-L) itself. There were inter-factional fights and eliminations but one group however followed the concept of mergers and acquisitions. In 1982, Kondapalli Seetha Ramaiah alias KS established the C.P.I.-ML (People's War Group) Incidentally in Andhra Pradesh because of internal weaknesses of Congress party, a regional party by name Telugu Desam led by a cinema actor-turned politician N.T. Rama Rao also emerged to occupy the political vacuum left by a weakened Congress. Soon after

its emergence, the People's War Group extended its influence through various cultural activities through Balle Dance group like Jana Natya Mandali and started working in collieries, in the predominantly tribal belt of Andhra Pradesh, in the Telangana areas of previous armed uprisings like Karim Nagar, Warangal, Khammam, Adilabad, Nalgonda districts and emerged as a pre-dominant Naxalite groups.

Incidentally, "*People's War Group*" is the name of the magazine of C.P.I. during the Second World War. The PWG believes in Class War and Communist manifesto of Karl Marx, theory of State and Revolution, Insurgency Tactics of Lenin and encirclement of towns by villages, armed militia and people's militia, ideas of Mao Tse Tung of China. By far being the most sinister organization which believes in overthrowing of State by violent means, including armed revolution and principles of proletarian dictatorship, the PWG soon established its control in certain areas and started parallel Government by calling such areas as "Liberated Zones".

1.3 Causes for Unrest in Peasantry and Tribal India

Peasant movements, world over, did have certain universal causes, the prime cause being that of land and its distribution. Most of the time, it was a spontaneous response of a section of peasants towards the perpetual injustice compelling farmers to organize themselves. Once formed, the peasant movement grew in size, as the entire community joined having suffered on the same ground and having been exposed to repeated injustice. The peasants' power lies in their numerical strength. Forming Organization is an expression of this newly found strength in numbers. There are many examples portraying the above historical reality. The peasant movements in the well irrigated coastal part of India addressed successfully many problems of agriculture and provided leadership to peasant movement elsewhere in Andhra Pradesh except in Rayalseema. Many leaders of Telangana peasant armed uprising during the early 1940's, like P. Sundrayya and M. Basava Punniah were from Coastal Andhra. The Telangana peasant uprising is the

predecessor of the Maoist Naxalite movement of Andhra Pradesh in 1967. The problems were of dry land farming mainly related to the weather, and quantity of rain fall during the monsoon. When the monsoon fails, the land-lord and landless do not get any crop, resulting in striking difference between the arid, dry land agriculture at areas and the irrigated and commercial crop growing areas. Similar has been the experience in the newly electrified villages. Here electricity is used for ground water lifting and irrigation. The middle and large farmers use the facility more quickly than the small/marginal farmers. Affordability of electric power became another differentiator between rich and poor and contributed to agrarian unrest. Relative deprivation and inter-regional differences in Andhra Pradesh too, contributed towards loss of credibility of governance and creation of vacuum.

Peasant movements grew and continue to grow in places where such movements were or are being led by local people. The Maoist affected Telngana region of Andhra Pradesh continues to be an example of such local people led peasant movement from earlier 1940's. Ravi Narayana Reddy, Bhim Reddy, Narasimha Reddy were the best examples of being local peasant leaders. The sons of the soil understand the soil more than those thrust upon the soil from elsewhere. The best examples in history were first, 'Zapatista movement in Mexico' and the 'Communist Movement in China' by Mao Tse Tung. As against this trait, the landlords use the tactics of hiring the local people to lead the movement or purchase the local leaders or ultimately assassinating the leaders through insurgency. Zapata was assassinated in Mexico in 1919. The beginning of tactics of peasant movement was always found to be with in the framework of non-violent means. Later on, as a different strategy, the core group of the peasant organization started revolutionary action as a response to the suppressive measures adopted by rigid landlords. The Telangana peasant armed uprising in the earlier 1940's is an example in this connection. The Telangana peasant armed uprising witnessed an armed struggle by peasants in the erstwhile principality of Nizam

mainly against the Razakars of Nizam and later against the Indian Army and State Police in the Post-Independence period (Sundarayya, 1976). The account of southern Mexican Zapata's Ayala plan is a parallel incident in a far away South American continent (Castro, 1999). The Tebagma movement in Bengal with developmental overtones was also another predominant predecessor to the armed movements of the peasantry in India.

The Telangana peasant armed uprising drew inspiration from international incidences like the Russian revolution and the activities of the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Mao. Theoreticians world over classify the peasant movements in many categories. *Shanin* (1971) differentiated the movements into three categories namely independent class action, (examples being, Russia, and Mexico) guided political action (Mao led Chinese movement and the Ho chi minh led Vietcong movement) and lastly, fully spontaneous amorphous political action.

In globalization supported market economies, government has minimized its role, the rural areas get affected more adversely since the poor people suffer from abject poverty and the asset formation even for rural rich would either remain stagnant or would even decline. Minimalist government intervention makes rural labour commoditized. Radhakrishna (2002) added, while discussing agrarian issues, that there is an increasing risk of uncertainty in agriculture. Work by *Praxis* (2001) in Bolangir district of western Odisha which is a drought prone district showed that, "Many marginal farmers were forced to migrate under exploitative conditions almost as bonded labourers leaving their own lands because they could not depend on an uncertain crop from degraded lands. Technology is becoming more capital intensive, often outside the reach of poor farmers". Sachs (2003) correlated governance with corruption, poverty and underdevelopment when he wrote, "The point is that virtually all poor countries have governance and corruption indicators that are below those of the high-income countries. Governance and higher income go hand in hand not only because good governance raises

incomes, but also and perhaps even more important, because higher income leads to improved governance. As a country's income rises, governance improves for two major reasons.

First, a more literate and affluent society is better able to keep the government honest by playing a watch dog role over government processes. Second a more affluent society can afford to invest in high quality governance. When governments are backed by ample tax receipts the civil service is better educated, extensive computerization improves information flows, and the public administration is professionally managed". Shah (2006) brought out the correlation between poverty, mis-governance and dry lands in India when he wrote, " People living in most severe extreme conditions of deprivation and abject poverty are a majority in the dry land areas. Farmers' suicides, starvation deaths, malnutrition children, some of the world's most anemic women (some 400 in million people) all inhabit the dry lands. It has been unequivocally established that this is where India's poverty and distress is concentrated. This is also where people feel a deep sense of cynicism and alienation with national mainstream. Over the years many of them have migrated to cities, landing in sub-human slums, many are taking to extremist violence and some are committing suicides".

The Communist Party of China (CPC) soon after establishing the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, went for massive land reforms. Snow (1972) termed the land redistribution accomplishment of CPC as "Rural Equalitarianism". Ladejinsky (1977) pointed out another Maoist strategy of involving women in the movement of peasants through secret services. "Women in the liberated areas derived significant benefits. Law reform granted them equal rights to land which was a first condition for peasant women's economic independence." (Ladejinsky, 1977). The World Bank studied the peasant movements in China both during the periods of communist revolution and after the formation of the People's Republic of China and felt that the land reform enabled the poor in receiving the land, assets, animals, agricultural tools

which resulted in recovery of agriculture and rapid growth in production in early 1950s. "The land reform campaign (in China) was quickly followed by vigorous attempts to promote agricultural cooperatives", (World Bank Documents on China, 1983). Ladejinsky accompanied General Douglas MacArthur of USA to Japan in the post World War – II period and assisted in land reforms in Japan and made observations about how General Douglas MacArthur, "stole the communist thunder in Japan with democratic land reforms which was America's most potent weapon for peace. The impact of the world wide peasant movements was there on the Indian subcontinent too which was still under the British colonial rule.

Comprehensive survey of the evolution of land relations yielded that an increasing population was not the only factor that determined the skewed relationship of labour to land (Biswanger, et al, 1995). Free peasants moved to the large manorial estates under pressure that systematically reduced their outside options. This situation arose because large tracts of unoccupied lands, including tracts of high quality, were assigned to members of the ruling class, thereby reducing the amount of free land available for small-scale cultivation. Coupled with this, differentially high taxes were imposed on free peasants, access to markets for output was restricted by setting up marketing schemes that restricted sources of purchases and infrastructural improvements as well as various subsidies were selectively provided to farms that belonged to the ruling class. These measures necessitated a high degree of connivance between the state and the ruling class. "Land reforms is the means to bring about a desired change in the agrarian structure, which includes the man-land relationship, man-man relationship on land and development as such." (Dantawada, (ed) 1986).

Absence of technology, imperfect labour and insurance markets all, led to low productivity of land, thus making for a strong case in support of owner cultivated family labour oriented small farm even for the purpose of productivity. The same is valid from the egalitarian point of view. Land reforms

need to be in the field but not on paper. Land reforms should be done after evolving a suitable mechanism with inbuilt capacity of implementation. "On grounds of equity also, the abolition of the multi-tier system of functionless parasitical intermediaries had long been overdue." (Ansari, 1986). "There shall be a nationalist ideology behind the demand for land reforms. They (the peasant movements) were part of the national ideology which professed radical socio-economic restructuring. It would be appropriate to say that the idea of land reforms emanated from much broader prospective of equality, modernization and development rather than from the limited point of view of productivity in agriculture and provision of security to peasants." (Kumar, 1986)

1.4 Tribal Issues

The tribals inhabit almost all the seriously affected Maoist areas in India. Examples are Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha states in India and North Andhra Pradesh districts of Srikakulam, Vijayanagaram, Vishakapatnam and East Godavari and the Telangana districts of Khammam, Karim Nagar, Warangal and Adilabad. Tribals are the worst affected group because of the asymmetric skewed economic reality. Tribals mostly live in forest villages. The tribal land properties are of ten types (Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India's report, October 2004). The first nine are more or less community ownership type and the last one is the individually owned land. The community owned land includes the general forest land from where the forest produce is consumed for daily use and some times for commercial use. There has been an argument in the name of development for large scale intrusion into tribal areas for mineral extraction, timber trade and hydel projects. "There are three flaws in such argument in that such intrusion ignores the creative strivings of the tribals in adapting themselves to natural environment, it ignores the fact that bulk of natural resources like minerals, timber, hydel power resources are located in the tribal areas and that tribal expectation and aspirations about cultural and ecological

aspects of these endowments are as much important as those of any section of population in determining the mainstream strategy and programme of development and thirdly the experience all over the world shows that there is a limit to the positive role of the State in human welfare." (Roy Burman, 1986). Ramesh (2010) mentions about large scale displacement of tribals who feed the recruitment channels of Maoists.

The forceful acquisition process caused loss of livelihood to the tribals resulting in a further loss of home and habitat, dislocation in the lifetime, ill-health and insecurity. Almost 80 percent of tribal population lives within five kilometers of forest, deriving their sustenance in form of food, fuel and timber and other forest produce. "The National Forest Policy has led both to the destruction of the forest and the impoverishment of the tribal. The tribal became alien to the forests and was denied access thereto. He was thereby shut out from his source of sustenance and de-linked from his social and cultural roots." (Expert Committee, 2004). The economic activity in the tribal community still functions partially on the systems of bartering. The tribal's relationship with the forest is harmonious and co-operative and not accumulative or competitive. The Expert Committee (2004) on prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land and its Restoration, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, records with distress that the tribal societies, with few exceptions, are deficient in terms of social development and the tribal people suffer from "capability poverty" and also from "income poverty"

Zamindars (Rural Landlords) made main incursions into the tribal areas resulting in alienation of vast tribal land. Zamindari abolition did not bring any real relief to the tribals as the Zamindari land was transferred to the state and not to the tribals. "The Government (of Andhra Pradesh) combined in itself the functions both the landlord and the state." (Expert Committee, 2004). The Expert Committee (2004) noted that the officialdom was capable of being as tyrannical to the tribal people as the Zamindars had been. The Tribal lands in the forest have 92 percent of the coal deposits, 92 percent of

Bauxite, 78 percent of Iron ore, 100 percent of Uranium, 85 percent of Copper and 65 percent of Dolomite in India. The land was acquired from the tribals and was handed over to the mining industrialists without either consent or adequate compensation to the inhabiting tribals. The Expert Committee (2004) concluded, on the basis of enquiry that the tribals do not derive occasional benefits of manufacturing and mining industries in terms of employment within organized sector. Industrialization also brought forth displacement, problems of resettlement and urban slums, denudation of the social security network and psychological dislocation for the entire communities. The existing framework of laws and the administrative machinery proved unequal to the task. The Expert Committee (2004) took note of the fact that this imparted a colonial character to the tribal existence. "This has given rise to the 'tribal dilemma' – submission to "nationalism' through 'mainstreaming' would lead to 'subinfeudation' and 'bondage' while more vigorous assertion of their rights through 'sub-nationalism' leads to falling a victim to the lures of 'radicalism' and even to 'irredentism'." (Expert Committee, 2004).

The tribal economy is not accumulative and practices like hiring of labour does not exist in tribal societies and hence there is no labour market. Thus landlessness among the tribals compels them to migrate. Even though, pressure of population brought basic changes in tribal agriculture from expansive shifting cultivation towards intensive settled agriculture, tribal agriculture is caught in low productivity trap with no capital investment and coupled with technological backwardness and no marketing facility for excess produce if at all produced; adverse conditions compel distress migration. With no accessibility of credit towards any Government controlled agricultural banking services, the debt trap of the tribals lead invariably towards distress migration.

Sustainable Development is the most important task of the government of India to remove poverty and to empower weaker sections of the Country. This task was neglected by

many governments, as was highlighted by the 2003 year report on Andhra Pradesh of Socio Economic Research (SER) division of the Planning Commission of India. Sustainable Development is important in case of tribals.

“Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom, poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.” (Sen. A, 2002). Sustainable Development (SD) is a pattern of resource use that aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met not only in the present, but also for generations to come. The term was used by the Brundtland commission which coined what has become the most often-quoted definition of sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Sustainable development ties together concern for the carrying capacity of natural systems with the social challenges facing humanity. As early as the 1970s “sustainability” was employed to describe an economy “in equilibrium with basic ecological support systems.” Ecologists have pointed to the limits of growth, and presented the alternative of a “steady state economy” in order to address environmental concerns. The field of sustainable development can be conceptually broken into three constituent parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and sociopolitical sustainability.

A dysfunctional government abdicating its vital responsibility towards sustainable development would create a social, economic and political vacuum which would be sought to be occupied by the challengers of the government. Management of such challenge or dissidence involves efficient administration of available resources within the legal framework by the government to prevent the challengers of its authority into becoming rebels and confirmed them within the legally permitted channels of political participation. Governance thus involves these two vital processes of

development and management of dissidence simultaneously. Any failure here will result in the loss of credibility of the government and embolden the challengers of its authority. In case of Andhra Pradesh Maoists were at the forefront in the challenge to the government.

1.5 Economic Causes of Maoism

The directive principles of State policy of Constitution of India (1950) raised expectations for creating an egalitarian welfare state with land reforms, reduction in socio economic inequality among the population. India being a predominantly agrarian economic society needed urgent implementation of land reforms especially when China was making huge progress in this field. Any structural imbalance with regard to man-land relationship is bound to result in peasants' unrest and would cause emergence of peasant movements. Shanin (1971) differentiates peasant movements into three classes, firstly of independent class action with examples of Lenin led Russian movement, Zapata led Mexican movement and Mao led Chinese movement, secondly guided political action and thirdly fully amorphous spontaneous political action while Snow (1972) mentions about the Communist Party of China in its contribution to land redistribution and rural equalitarianism.

McNamara (1973) points out that half-hearted measures as adopted in India failed to solve the agrarian crisis and apprehended that the resulting failure may lead to a far more painful revolutionary violence. Ladejinsky (1977) mentions about the abolition of Zamindari system as one of the easiest measures, symbolic of land reforms, indicating the end of the British rule. Etienne (1982) adds that abolition of the intermediary parasites did not result in efficient and effective land ceiling. The benami land owners (false land owners) replaced the Zamindars by creating religious trusts and thus, deprived a large number of poor farmers and landless labourers to benefit from the land reform. This resulted in insufficient investment in agriculture. Bhandari (1984) argues

that in backward regions, rural oligarchies found usury more profitable than investment in agriculture.

Ansari and Kumar (1986) consider it in terms of equity, equality, modernization, development and a sense of belongingness to land reforms and not merely one of land-productivity. Dantawala (1986) mentions the urgent need for land reforms and land redistribution to bring in a desirable change in the relations between man-land, man-man and land-land development issues. Kumar (1986) observes that since land reform laws were passed without required political will to implement it and since the former Zamindars joined politics and became the legislators and ministers, the thrust of idealism in the political parties seen before 1947, was no longer found on the surface.

Ray (1996) observes how the situation in India, through share-cropping went against the interests of the tenant, causing abject poverty in rural India. Prasad (1993) describes the pauperization of peasantry on account of faulty revenue system. Singh (1993) narrates his personal experience as District Magistrate in Gaya district of Bihar state as to how the land ceiling act was grossly violated and how Gaya district of Bihar state became the hotbed of Naxalite violence.

Swamy and Gangly (1990) argue that food crisis and famines compelled a shift from structural changes in agriculture to technological developments like green revolution. Yugandhar and Iyyar (1991) point out lack of empathy from the Indian judiciary for the impoverished landless labourers and artisans since land reforms saw many cases of litigations.

Biswanger, et al. (1995), substantiate the same when they argued that most of the large scale agrarian reforms were associated with revolts and reforms without political upheaval rarely succeeding in transforming much of the structural elements of agriculture. Bannerjee (1998) adds a political economy approach to the non-stakeholderiness of poor in such an inequitable system and cites the examples of the Shining Path movement in Peru and Naxalite movement in Bihar. Sen

and Dreze (2002) argue for the investments in human development sector like education, health and drinking water. Radhakrishna (2002) feels that agriculture is witnessing increasing uncertainty. Castro (2004) narrates how the Mexican movement in 1910-19 resulted in land reforms. Ramesh (2010 under review) mentions how uncompensated/un-rehabilitated peasants become potential recruits to Maoists. "Around 60 million persons were displaced for the period from 1947 to 2004 involving 25 million hectares." (Seminar Aug, 2006). Kartan (1992) observes that peasant organizations sprang up as an ultimate self-defense mechanism.

The Indian Planning Commission (2003) has also shown its concern about the ill effects of displacement of the masses from their functional and physical occupations. Withdrawal in the percentage of subsidies proved like rubbing salt on a chronic wound. Work by Praxis (2001) in Bolangir district of the Orissa state points out the distress migration of marginal farmers resulting in the degradation of their lands.

Burman (1986) highlights the plight of tribals, non-registration of their land, non-recognition of their ownership, inaccessibility to loans, interference by non-tribals and vast displacement caused on account of mining and other projects including tiger reserves. By 1985, 20 million farmers were displaced in India because of the so-called development projects. Government of India's Expert Committee Report on Development challenges in Extremist affected areas (2008) feels that internal displacement caused by irrigation/mining/industrial projects, resulting in landlessness and hunger, is a major cause of distress among the poor, especially the adivasis (tribals) and that 40 percent of all the people displaced by dams in the last sixty years are forest-dwelling adivasis (tribals). The Maoist movement has come to the aid of such victims of enforced migration. Landless adivasis (tribals) mainly of the Muria or Gothi koya tribe of Chhattisgarh have long been crossing over into the forests of Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh in search of land, with the support of the Maoists. The report points out among other things, the following prominent

causes of Maoism, namely, that 58 percent of Indian labour forces being still engaged in agriculture, that there are 63 varieties of untouchability being practiced, that lack of education, limited employment opportunities, political marginalization, social discrimination, increasing number of crimes committed against weaker sections of people, absence of self governance, forest policy, excise policy, cultural humiliation, land alienation, forced evictions from land, distress migration, indebtedness, absence of credit and high usurious interest rates, leading to suicides. The Forest survey of India (2003) points out that out of the total 187 tribal districts of India, 60 percent of forest cover lies in these 187 districts.

Shah (2006) highlights the peculiar features of dry land farming in India and people with the highest degree of malnutrition and maximum degree of alienation and animosity. These dry lands become the targets of CPI (Maoists). Thus it is seen, how poor farmers and peasants who constitute the majority of the India's rural economy have been affected by the short-sighted land reform policies resulting in emergence of peasants' rebellion and ideologies of Maoism captured the situation to strengthen their position.

The organizational, economic and special causes for emergence of Maoist movement in India can be clearly brought out by the mutually exclusive positioning adopted by all the three Communist Parties in India namely CPI, CPI (Marxist) and CPI (Maoist) on any politico economic issue in the Country. While the CPI took a pro-Congress stance during emergency period (1975-76), CPI (Marxist) and the CPI (Maoist) took anti Congress stance. CPI and CPI (Marxist) participated in elections but CPI (Maoist) boycott the same. This takes us to the second part of the literature survey namely ideology and expanse of Maoist movement in Andhra Pradesh, India.

1.6 Ideology of Maoist Movement in india

Mohanty (1977) defines ideology as the statement of end, means and a method of analysis and mentions that conditions necessary for conversion of guerilla war which is in the form

of protracted people's war to positional wars are the popular support, favorable terrain, vulnerable enemy and element of surprise. The Maoists prepared an alternate draft against the

Madurai draft of the CPI (Marxist) and in that draft they described Maoism as Marxism-Leninism of modern times. Maoism was defined as "Peoples Democracy, Peoples war, completion of the socialist revolution through the cultural revolution, an irreconcilable ideological battle against modern revisionism." (Janasakti, 1968).

People's War was the "Universal method for national liberation movements". It was observed that "in all backward countries the mass movements after reaching a particular stage have to face severe repression of the Government. After this stage has been reached the peoples movements could make further advance only by beating back the repressive measures, only by combining the mass movements with armed struggle." (CPI(M), 1969). "Ours is a vast country with uneven development. Peoples, movements are also developing unevenly. In these conditions, in today's economic and political crisis, militant struggles are bound to break out in various part of the country. The Communist Party must boldly lead these struggle... resist the repressive measures... develop the anti-landlord struggles... co-ordinate all these struggles and according to a plan develop these struggles towards a people war." (Rajakiya Nirmana Sammeksha, 1969). The ideology of CPI (Maoist) believes to "build a strong and disciplined Communist Party through struggles based on Marxism-Leninism".

Indian Independence, for the Maoists, was only formal and it was ruled by the comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie which was allied to feudalism and was subservient to imperialism. The path to India's liberation, they concluded lay in guerrilla struggles based on peasantry." (Sinha, 1989). In contrast to Bengal Maoists in the year 1967 who thought that situation as ripe for overall revolution in India, Andhra Maoists adopted a cautious ideological approach. The Andhra Maoists felt the need for educating the people and for carrying out revolution

in a phased manner and at a much slower pace, while Bengal Maoists felt that, "Militant struggles must be carried on not for land, crops etc., but for seizure of state power." (Majumdar, 1968). In contrast to the Bengal Maoists line of immediate armed struggle, the Andhra Maoists believed in Protracted War where in the achievement of revolution was seen as the outcome of a long and arduous struggle. The Andhra Maoists did not differ with the Bengal Maoists on the necessity of an armed struggle but they differed considerably on the issue of modus-operandi. The Andhra Maoists laid more emphasis on the process of party building and mass organizations.

"Ideological struggles, out of which a revolutionary party would emerge, occupied a very important place and was even viewed as a precondition to revolutionary struggles. To the Andhra group thus an armed struggle was in no way a prerequisite for building up either the party or a movement. Again, though the Andhra group agreed that the party organization was to be secret in nature, they did not agree with the Bengal groups' view that the party activities must be limited to armed struggles and illegal activities alone. In their view every form of activity potentially capable of raising the level of people's consciousness and this included mass movement, activities of civil rights associations and trade unions, was to be harnessed." (APCC Revolutionaries, 1974).

A vast majority of Andhra Maoists except those like Kondapalli Seetha Ramaiah, Vempatapu Satayam and P. Krishnamurthy, believed in the unification of all Maoists groups in the country. The majority of Andhra Maoists did not treat Srikakulam struggle as a liberation struggle. They were skeptical about the level of people's preparedness for the liberation struggle and could view armed struggle for liberation as only an end product of a series of struggles by the peasantry against feudal oppression. The Andhra Maoists view that, to the peasant, liberation meant freedom from the feudal system and satisfaction of his hunger for land.

The Naxalite movement of Bengal Maoists was easily crushed by the police action where as the Andhra Maoists

continued the building of their parities and activities, well into the late 1970s and 1980s. However Mohan (1969) feels that the first split of CPI in the year 1964 was a factional split, while the second split in the years 1967-69 was an ideological split, leading to the emergence of the Naxalite movement. Sinha (1989) opines that Naxalism was the first recent example of the practice of Maoist path in India. Naxalbari's importance in the history of Indian Maoist movement is based not on the intensity of the movement or its success (both of these were quite limited) but on its symbolic significance and theoretical value. According to the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee (APRCC, 1969) "Naxalbari peasant armed struggle brought forward the issue of people's war path; led to ideological discussions in the party; played a historical role by exposing neo-revisionist ideas; it brought out the internal struggle in party; it encouraged revolutionary struggle in other states to intensify ideological struggles". To an extent it became an exercise in translating Maoism from theory to practice in Indian conditions.

The ideology of Peoples War, Protracted Peoples War, building of secret party, building of Peoples Liberation Army, Guerrilla Warfare – are all part of Maoist thought, which Mao perfected and Andhra Maoists too followed. CPI (ML) PWG was formed in 1980 in Andhra Pradesh and worked through mergers and ultimately emerged as CPI (Maoists) on 21st September 2004. The basic ideological theme of early 1960s continues even today with additions on issues of globalization, liberalization and marketization.

1.7 Expanse of Maoists Movement

The Telangana peasant armed uprising of 1940s saw the militant armed movement by the peasants against the Nizam's Razakaras and the CPI which led the movement continued to adhere to militancy till the year 1951. In the post spilt of 1964 period too, the Maoist sympathizers like Tarimella Nagi Reddy, Chandra Pulla Reddy continued adherence to militancy and preferred a mixture of legal and illegal methods to increase the

influence of the CPI (Marxist).

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India, in a report of the year 1969 mentioned that the failure to tackle the Naxalite movement may lead to a situation where the discontented elements are compelled to organize themselves, causing extreme tension building up within the complex molecule that is the Indian village to end in an explosion.

“The emergence of CPI (Marxist-Leninist) and formation of Andhra Pradesh Coordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries (APCCCR) exposed the strong difference between Bengal Maoists and Andhra Maoists.” (Sinha, 1989).

A Pro-Charu Majumdar APCCCR of Adibhatla Kailasam, V. Satyam took initiative in Srikakulam uprising of 1969. The police action suppressed the same in the 1970s. In the year 1980, Kondapalli Seetha Ramaiah started CPI (M-L) PWG in the year 1980. A new thinking of mergers with all communist parties all over Andhra Pradesh and then all over India was put into practice and in by late 1990s. The mergers resulted in the emergence of a pan Indian Maoist party on 21st September 2004 in the name of CPI (Maoist) whose presence in the year 2008 was in 125 districts and who expanded to 221 districts in 12 states in May, 2010 (Naxal Management Division, 2010).

The mergers of the Maoists is in contrast with splitting of mainstream political parties. The Indian National Congress was split in the years 1969, 1977, 1991, 1996 into various fractions like Reddy Congress, Indira congress, Tamil Makkal Cogress (Tamil Nadu), Tirnamool Congress (West Bengal), National Congress (Maharashtra and Bihar). The Janata Party was also split in to Lokdal, Kranthidal, Janatadal (Secular, United) and Samata Party. The Bharatiya Janata Party also had factional split with former chief ministers of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya leaving the party and establishing their own independent regional political parties.

1.8 Tribals and Maoist Movement

The Maoist movement in any particular region is not due to area specific causes of that particular region alone. The Maoist movement is a pan-India movement and the causes are also mutually influencing, having vast coverage both in time and space across India. Andhra Pradesh, being a central part of India, shares many common factors among these causes. Except Bihar and West Bengal, the rest of all Maoist affected states of India share physical borders and demographical bonds with Andhra Pradesh. The Dandakaranya belt of central India covers Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. In terms of chronology, it is in the state of Andhra Pradesh where the militant Maoist movement originated first.

The second ARC on reforms in governance has a dedicated chapter on Maoism (Left Wing Extremism). The approach paper of the second ARC on reforms in governance and administration mentions that, the Tenth Plan document identified good governance as the single most important factor in ensuring that the plan objectives are achieved. Decentralization of power and citizen's empowerment, effective people's participation through state and non-state mechanisms, greater synergy and consolidation among various agencies and programmes of government, civil service reforms, transparency, rationalization of government schemes, improved access to formal justice system to enforce rights, reforms and strengthening of land administration and harnessing the power of technology for governance have been identified as the key priorities. There is increasing lawlessness in several pockets of the country, and armed groups are resorting to violence with impunity for sectarian or ideological reasons. The State apparatus is generally perceived to be largely inefficient, with most functionaries serving no useful purpose. The bureaucracy is generally seen to be tardy, inefficient, and unresponsive. Corruption is all-pervasive, eating into the vitals of Indian system, undermining economic

growth, distorting competition, and disproportionately hurting the poor and marginalized citizens. The approach paper of the second ARC further mentions that there is abuse of authority at all levels in all organizations of State which became a bane of Indian democracy and that, globalization should not be at the cost of Indian people and that the negative power of abuse of authority in pursuit of self, privilege and patronage creates an imbalance with the positive power in promoting public good and that "This imbalance in the exercise of power is at the heart of crisis of governance".

Coupled with the imbalance in the exercise of power, there is an asymmetry in the wielding of power. The approach paper is categorical in its opinion when it mentions, "Abdication of the State or its inefficiency in the critical sectors will spell disaster to our future". The approach paper identified broad areas namely the areas of public order, justice of rule and law, the areas of human development through good quality education, healthcare, the area of infrastructure and sustainable natural resource development and finally the area of social security.

1.8.1 The Three Phases of Maoists Movement

The first phase of the Maoist movement is the extension of the Telangana peasant armed uprising. The second phase is inspired by the Naxalite movement in West Bengal which spread to the Srikakulam areas of Andhra Pradesh and also in the Telangana region and the third phase was the post 1982 peoples war movement of the Maoist which was the most militant movement, the remnants of which is still being seen in parts of North coastal Andhra Pradesh and Telangana region. Militant movements, primarily addressing the effects of failure of land reforms, turned into violent armed struggles by the mid 1960's and were spread over the vast forest hinterland inhabited by the tribals. Naxalite Movement sprang from a small town of Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967. It spread to other areas, drawing inspiration from such militant movements, experimented elsewhere addressing the specific

issue of severe exploitation of landless labourers by the absentee landlords with the police protection. Naxalites were greatly influenced by the ideology of Mao who was the chairman of Peoples Republic of China, in 1967. The ideology of Naxalite movement was shaped by Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal with a strategy to eliminate the enemies (landlords and police) and overthrow state administration by armed struggle of the peasants. Naxalite movement spread like a wild fire and attempted to annihilate all those who appeared to oppose that and the movement was viewed as, "the first testing ground of the theory of area wise seizure of power", and as, "a struggle not for land or crops but for political power." (Sinha, 1989). The movement was promptly suppressed by the West Bengal state police forces resulting in many splits due to their commission of adventurous activities and revisionist mistakes. Even though the movement was a failure, it retained its symbolic significance and theoretical value as it was the first recent example of practice of Maoist path in India, and to an extent it became an exercise in translating of Maoism from theory to practice in Indian conditions." (Sinha, 1989).

Marx and Engels (1857) in the earlier 19th century started a new trend of explaining human relations in terms of invisible economic realities and explained that the onward march of civilization was one of progress resulting from ceaseless class struggles and through the ever conflicting tendencies of thesis, anti thesis resulting in synthesis which again gave birth to another anti thesis resulting in yet another synthesis. It was Russia's Lenin (1917), who led the Bolshevik (October) Revolution in 1917 and established a socialist republic out of predominantly rural agrarian feudal Kingdom, far from the Marxist prediction of industrialized Europe like Germany or France leading such revolutions of working classmen. It was in far away South American State of Mexico, in the 1910-1919 decade that Zapata (1910) led the peasant struggle through Guerrilla Warfare (GW) against the ruling establishment and succeeded in land reforms for southern Mexicans. While


Zapata paved the way for agrarian struggles through guerrilla tactics by unclear even women, Lenin contributed the theory of imperialism when he explained that the industrial and financial capital with the help of the powerful state attacks other countries and establishes colonies for supply of raw materials and uses the colonies as markets for their products, Deliberate action, informed decision and intelligent strategy on the part of the working class is necessary for the creation of a communist society. Marxists like Lenin called for investing the state with a revolutionary spirit and explained the difference between the state dictatorship and the working class dictatorship through two mass concepts namely protection of majority interest and removal of perpetuation and that state dictatorship perpetuates the minority interest while the working class dictatorship perpetuates the majority interest.

1.8.2 Strategy and Tactics

Lenin developed and built the Communist Party (CP) of Soviet Union (CPSU) and made democratic centralism as a Mao planned for establishing revolutionary base areas first in the country side where the enemy was very weak and then to gradually encircle and capture the cities which were the bastions of the enemy forces. Mao used propaganda as political strategy in creating a favorable public opinion and used a suitable military strategy in such a manner that the political strategy and the military strategy were perfect fit. Mao's concept of PPW needed an army. Mao named such army as People's Army. 'Without People's Army, people having nothing' was Mao's feeling. Mao came out with the concept of three magic weapons namely building up of the CP, building up of the People's Army and building up of the United Front (UF). The UF and the armed struggle were the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. Mao felt, "The UF was for carrying the armed struggle and the CP was the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons".

The People's Army was designed to perform the following tasks namely fighting to destroy the enemy while preserving

its own strength, propaganda among masses, mobilizing the masses and arming them, helping the masses to establish revolutionary political power, setting up and developing the party organizations and participating in production. Mao felt, "Power flows from the barrel of the gun. The party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party". Suitable tactics were adopted in converting a propaganda slogan into an agitation slogan and then into an action slogan and ultimately as the Party Directive, which is depicted in the following chain:-



The CPI (Maoist) in Andhra Pradesh is to have the professional revolutionaries as the core, part time members as the base. The party organization needs to be secretive and network needs to be impregnable. The Maoist Communist Party needs to keep the following cardinal principles in mind namely supremacy of political consciousness and organizational strength, supremacy of the revolutionary objective, supremacy of the first initiative by the party, guarding of the party from sectarianism, subjectivism, empiricism and right or left deviationist tendencies and supremacy of the Mass line. The People's Army needs to maintain its difference from other armies as the main task of the People's Army is the political work and this task is ensured through the control of the People's Army by the communist party. The People's Army is to fight the PW, in which the Communist Party recognizes that the government army is big and the people's army is small, that the government army is strong and the people's army is weak, that the people's army needs to utilize the weakness of the government army and needs to strengthen its base and get support from the people. The people support for the people's army is the main plank for the communist party's expansion, consolidation and victory. Mao prescribed a manual for the People's Army or the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through the concepts of

People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) and People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA).

The famous 3/8 principles of Mao, a vital part of little red book, the bible of Maoist communist party members of Andhra Pradesh are firstly the three rules of discipline being obeying orders in all actions, not misappropriating even a single needle or piece of thread from the masses and handing over everything captured to the party commander. The eight points of attention are, speaking politely, paying fairly for what was bought, returning everything borrowed, paying for everything that was damaged, not hitting or swearing at the people, not damaging the crops, not taking liberties with women and not abusing captives.

Mao prescribed the structure of PGA and PLGA and desired to convert the units of above into PLA with various wings like communications, intelligence, supplies, ordinance and artillery, medical and politico-military training wing and Andhra Pradesh Maoists follow the same. The Guerrilla Warfare (GW) is the method of warfare by which the exploited classes would liberate themselves. The GW is waged by the side which is short on resources but high on courage and has focus on ideology. Alertness, mobility and attack are the strategic points of GW. Mao felt, 'The essence of GW is – when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue'. The United Front would be constituted with the urban industrial worker, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The United Front needs to be always subordinate to the main CP. The United Front of mass organizations is invariably essential in training and preparing the masses for the struggle. Peasants struggle for land reforms was the center point of Maoist movement all over the world including Andhra Pradesh.

The Communist Party of India was the parent organization from which the Communist Party of India (Maoist) wing emerged. In India, peasants movement and nationalist movement ran side by side under the leadership of the Indian

National Congress (INC) and later on by the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS). AIKS was started by Swami Saraswati from Bihta Ashram in 1936. The Communist Party of India (CPI) started taking keen interest in the problems of the peasants and in the early 1940s and launched the Telangana Rebellion in Hyderabad. In the year 1964, a new faction came into being which was called CPI(Marxist). There was a further split and the newer faction called itself as CPI(Marxist-Leninist) which started and led the Naxalbari movement, known as Naxalite movement in 1967 in the state of West Bengal. The splits went unabated and at one point of time, there were as many as 36 Marxist-Leninist groups in the country, notable being the Bengal and Andhra groups. The Naxalite movement in West Bengal was crushed due to police action and also by the mindless adventure of its leadership. However the Naxalite movement spread to north coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh and it was not to be easily contained since the Naxalites were operating in the forest areas of Eastern Ghats and the Godavari valley of Andhra Pradesh.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India, in a report of the year 1969 with reference to the Andhra Pradesh Maoist movement in Srikakulam mentioned that the failure to tackle the Naxalite movement may lead to a situation where the discontented elements are compelled to organize themselves, causing extreme tension building up within the complex molecule that is the Indian village to end in an explosion. "The Communists in India did not create any grievances and they only articulated the grievances to the obvious satisfaction of the large groups of non-political farmers." (Ladijenskey, 1951). Robert Mc Namara, the former president of World Bank felt, "Half hearted measures as adopted in India and Philippines in the late 1950s cannot solve the crisis and that fundamental measures, however unpalatable, needs to be taken and any failure to undertake painful but essential reform inevitably leads to a far more painful revolutionary violence." (Samuel, 1968).

1.8.3 Emergence of Communist Party of India (Maoist)

The CPI (Marxist-Leninist) people's war group CPI (M-L) in the year 1980 started merging with like minded parties. In the year 1980, the most dreaded Left Wing Extremist organization CPI (M-L) People's War group was formed by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah. The year 1982 is a water shed year because of a emergence of Peoples War group of CPI (ML) and that of Telugu Desam, a regional party challenging the political hegemony of Indian National Congress under the leadership of a matinee –idol turned politician namely late N.T. Ramarao (Died, 1996). CPI (M-L)(PW-G) merged with CPI (ML) (Party Unity) of Bihar and emerged as CPI(ML) (PW) in 1998 covering AP, Odisha, Maharashtra and the then Madhya Pradesh, Meanwhile, Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar, West Bengal and Odisha merged with Revolutionary Communist Center of India (Maoist) (RCCI(M)) of Punjab in January 2003 and emerged as Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). MCCI and CPI(M-L)(PW) merged with each other on 21st September 2004 and formed the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The CPI (Maoist) has presence in 221 districts in the following 21 States namely Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Assam, Tripura, Jammu & Kashmir and Rajasthan. There are fifteen State committees, working under four Regional Bureaus and one Central Propaganda Bureau. The following figure 1.1 mentions the spread of the Maoist movement in India. The second Administrative Reforms Commission(ARC) in the year 2008 categorizes Maoist movement under ideology oriented terrorism and that Maoists are known for resorting to violence in pursuance of their ideology of people's revolutionary movement and that the People's War group faction of Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) succeeded in mobilizing a fairly large section of the rural population and some of its programmes could create a climate of wide public support and that for quite some time, the people in these areas of PWG

influence could witness the utter lack of good and effective administration.




Figure 1.1: Spread of the Movement–Maoist Movement affected States (21)

1.8.4 Ideology of CPI (Maoists)

The revolutionary violence is the base of the Maoist movement whose main doctrine was the concept of People’s War (PW). The name of the Magazine, run by the CPI during World War-II was also “The People’s War”. The conditions necessary for the protracted wars which may be Guerrilla War or positional war are popular support, favourable terrain, vulnerable enemy and element of surprise. The first stage is war of annihilation encircling the enemy without attacking, cutting off the communication without encircling. The second stage is establishment of revolutionary base areas. The third stage is liberation of area and the final stage is the consolidation.

“Revolution can be defined as an action process in which

one or more organizations pursue strategies of violent action to transform the environment in accordance with their ideology. Ideology is the Statement of ends, means and a method of analysis." (Mohanty, 1977). In the Maoist outlook, organizations are conceived as a body of people involved in collective political action. The organizations need to become the point of synthesis between ideology and environment. The communist parties claim that it is the importance of ideology that caused both splits and mergers. "The first split in the Indian Communist Movement has been a factional split than an ideological split." (Mohan, 1969).

The CPI (Maoist) views India as new colony affected by four mountains namely feudalism, Comprador Big Bourgeoisie (CBB), imperialism and social imperialism. Following the Maoist Principles, the CPI (Maoist) seeks to establish a people's democratic front in India, under the working class leadership with alliance of peasants, the revolutionary intelligentsia and the nation's middle and upper middle classes. The CPI (Maoist) is qualitatively different from the Naxalite movement in its initial strong organizational capabilities and in its deep application of the Maoists principles in the pre-dominantly tribal area of the country.

The CPI(Maoist) wants to usher in New Democratic Revolution (NDR). The CPI(Maoist) learnt a costly lesson from the experience of Naxalite movement and built a powerful organization. It took two years of police action to wipe out Naxalism whereas Maoists are present across in 221 districts as on 14 May, 2010. The CPI (Maoist) refuses to believe that India got independence in 1947 and they paint the freedom of the country as a mere transformation from a colonial and feudal society into semi-colonial and semi feudal society. The CPI (Maoist) believe that, 'After the British Colonialists were compelled to give up their direct rule over India, the powers were transformed to their CBB and big land lords on the condition that the imperial capital and their interests are protected'. The CPI (Maoist) cites the Non Performing Assets (NPA) of thousands of millions of rupees of the banks as an

evidence of the connivance of the public sector Indian banks, the judiciary, the media, the politician and the bureaucrats. This connivance is termed by the CPI (Maoist) as Comprador Bureaucratic Capitalism (CBC). The CPI (Maoist) believes that in the name of globalization, the comprador bureaucrat – capitalists are selling the natural resources at throw away prices to the foreign Multi National Companies (MNCs) and thus the plunder and loot goes unabated through many Special Economic Zones (SEZ).

The general people especially the voiceless, aboriginal community namely the tribals are at the receiving end since they are the inhabitants of the forest and mineral – resource rich stretches of forest areas. Thousands of tribal families are displaced in the name of development of infrastructure. The connivance among the native trio of capitalist – politician – bureaucrat with their foreign Multinational collaborators is responsible for the ecological disaster, suicide by the farmers, continuous poverty, misery, ill health and ill-literacy. The CPI (Maoist) propagates that due to this alliance among the three main enemies of Indian people, real land reforms was never attempted and the basic structure of agrarian class relations never changed and usurious and mercantile exploitation of vast masses in the countryside continues to be unhindered even after sixty one years of so-called independence.

1.8.5 Strategy of CPI (Maoist) in india

Mao (1945) mentioned the importance of mass-base for political parties and stressed on peasant struggles. Maoists like Lin-Piao combined the political strategy with military strategy with emphasis on agrarian revolution, area wise seizure and its consolidation and expansion. The Maoists adapted the protracted people's war strategy, while their first weapon, namely, the Communist Party concentrated on political strategy, the second weapon, namely, people's liberation army concentrated on military strategy and the third weapon, namely the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked the legitimacy of the state.

CPI (Maoist) documents (2005) confirm the belief of Andhra Pradesh Maoists the party should keep in mind the below mentioned cardinal principles always throughout the revolutionary period which are, firstly people's political consciousness should guide the forms of organization and struggle and the next criterion is organizational strength, secondly the party should always keep the revolutionary objective in front and thirdly initiative especially during the difficult transitory stages should never be lost by the party. Anticipatory power of the next stage of struggle must be there with the party and that leadership of the party shall excel in this role, fourthly the party should guard itself from aspects of sectarianism, subjectivism, empiricism and right or left deviationist tendencies, finally the general people's problems mass line must be the sole criteria for activity of the party.

Sundarayya (1976) indicates how the local farmers transformed themselves into an armed group of fighters during Telangana Armed Struggle, 1946. The Expert Committee, of Planning Commission, Government of India, (2008) feels that radical groups seek the justification for their methods of violence from structural violence which is implicit in the social and economic system. "In their perspective armed struggle was a product of a certain stage of revolutionary development and was necessary for taking the revolutionary process to higher stages." (Sinha, 1989).

The seized CPI (Maoist) documents (2006) mention that political activity of the party should be supported by military strength, which is termed as "Military line", and such military line should be subordinate to political line. The status-quoist state forces, even during crisis, would not give up the power and such "anti people" forces need to be crushed militarily by people's army. CPI (Maoist) echoes the off quoted Maoist slogan, "with out's people's army, people have nothing. Political power flows through barrel of gun, but it is the communist party which should command the gun and not the gun commanding the communist party".

The doctrine of People's War (PW) was developed by Mao

and was adopted by the Indian Maoists. PW is based on the two premises namely that people's army is different from other armies since the main reason of existence of people's army is political work and the second premise is that since people's army fight a PW with a bigger, stronger state's army, the people's army should exploit all weaknesses of the state's army by enlisting the support of common people and the three main rules of discipline are firstly to obey orders in all the actions, secondly not to take a single needle or a piece of thread from the masses and thirdly to turn in everything captured the revised eight points of attention are firstly to speak politely, secondly to pay fairly for what ever is bought, thirdly to return every thing that is borrowed fourthly to pay for everything that is damaged, fifthly not to hit or swear at the people, sixthly not to damage crops, seventhly not to take liberties with women and finally not to abuse captives." (Piao L, 1945).

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2006) point out that the main aim of People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) or PLGA is spreading propaganda among people, organizing masses, arming the masses, helping the masses in establishing their organs of political power, developing the party, participating in production. The structure of the PGA is also prescribed as platoons, squads, companies which are all armed, supported by people's militia. People's militias are also the vast recruitment grounds for the armed cadres of PGA or PLGA.

The CPI (Maoist) documents(2007) mention that in order to enhance the fighting capacity of the PGA or PLGA, expand it and transform it into PLA, various wings like communications, intelligence, supplies, ordinance, artillery, medical and politico-military training are required and that war continuously changes and so does the strategies and structures of the military organization and by destroying the state's army piece by piece, the platoon-squad- company formations graduate themselves in to brigades, columns and divisions, ultimately transforming the PGA-PLGA combine in to PLA the three forms of PW are firstly Guerrilla Warfare (GW), secondly Mobile Warfare and finally positional warfare.

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2008) point out the nature of GW being a method of war by which the exploited classes liberate themselves and that GW is waged by quantitatively weak but qualitatively strong side and the tactics include not resorting to fighting when the enemy is strong but conducting attacks when the enemy is weak, the tactics also include hit and run methods. GW follows the Mobility Attack Alertness (MAA) strategy in that during non combating period, the Guerrilla Warriors of CPI(Maoist), propagate party ideology among common people. The documents (2008) echo what Mao said so often that the essence of GW is that when the enemy advances, we retreat, when the enemy camps, we harass, when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue. The real essence of Positional Warfare, in Mao's words is, "Fight when you can, move away when you cannot". The twin principled strategy for the three pronged warfare is that the CPI (Maoist) forces fight when they can and retreat when they cannot and to prolong war in order to buy time so as to prepare the common people for PPW.

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2009) assert the application of the customized Maoist tactics to Indian conditions and the first tactical principle is that the state's forces must be annihilated in a methodical, sector-by-sector process in which the superior forces suddenly strike when the state's forces are unprepared, resting, eating, sleeping. The second tactical principle is that the people's liberation army must mobilize the people to support itself enthusiastically and to fight the enemy together with them. The people are the eyes and ears of the PLA, the people feed and give shelter to PLA. It is the people who help the PLA in sabotaging operations and in general battles. 'The People is the water and the PLA is the fish'.

The documents (2009) further mention that drawing from the experiences of China, Vietnam, the Maoists divided the PPW into three stages namely first stage of strategic defensive, second stage of strategic stalemate and third stage of strategic offensive and the Maoists explain that, based on the experience of other countries, it is evident that the first stage will be

consuming more time. The Maoists reject the arguments of participating in parliament. By explaining their reasons they contend that, participation in parliamentary politics will drive the party towards legalism, divert the energies from the pains taking and difficult task of building a secret party. They feel that there is no objective basis in India for exposing the parliamentary system from within. They conclude that parliamentary politics directly run against their avowed objective of PPW.

1.8.6 Tactics of CPI (Maoist)

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2009) express that the CPI (Maoist) desires to maintain correct inter relationship between the four aspects namely Propaganda, Investigation, Struggle and Organization (PISO). In this way, the party desires to launch and gradually develop red resistance struggle and struggle for wiping out feudalism-lock, stock and barrel. The Andhra Maoists plan to establish the Revolutionary Peoples' Committee (RPC) in the GZ, the main task of each RPC is to propagate the following seven slogans, which are firstly over throwing feudal authority, establish people's political power, secondly taking over the lands of the landlords, the lands of the government and of other exploiting institutions and distributing them to the poor and landless peasants, thirdly building armed people's militia; fourth points stopping repayment of debts and interests to landlords and money-lenders, fifth stopping paying taxes and levies to the government; sixth that right over the forest belongs to Adivasis (tribals) and toiling people and hence stopping the plunder of forest wealth by imperialists, CBB and big contractors and finally initiating agriculture and development, cooperative movement, increase in production and rural achieve, self-reliance in every Sphere (in the form of slogan).

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2009) mention that the Maoists elaborate their economic development programme and that they should intensify the agrarian revolution and mobilize the people for the co-operative movement during the course of

the advance of the revolutionary war and the formation of GZs and guerrilla bases. In the beginning primary cooperatives may come into existence to meet the needs of the people. Mutual aid teams can be formed by mobilizing agricultural labourers, poor peasants and middle peasants. The cooperatives should be formed on the basis of resolving the problems of labour power, bullocks, fertilizers, seeds and irrigation.

The labour and capital of the people should be the main component in this cooperative movement. However, labour is the key aspect. Consumer and credit cooperatives too should be built. This co-operativisation movement should be expended in the guerrilla bases and thousands of people should be mobilized. The hegemony of the landless peasants, agricultural labourers, poor peasants should be established over all these cooperatives and that the Indian Maoists admit their disillusionment with urban working class and yet they maintain that they do not loose hope.

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2009) point out that mass organizations are absolutely indispensable for the victory of any revolution with the main aim being one of organizing the masses for revolution. The task of increasing the political consciousness among masses is planned to be achieved through various struggles, differentiating the CPI (Maoist) from other political organizations. Mass organization is thus a powerful weapon to convince the masses and instill confidence in them that they can liberate themselves from oppression and exploitation through collective organization and struggle. The most important task of the CPI (Maoist) within the mass organizations is to arouse the idea of seizure of power through armed means.

“Forms of organization and forms of struggle differ according to differing conditions in different regions in the country. Moreover, the conditions in the same region, state or the country as a whole, do not remain static but keep on changing continuously thereby bringing to the fore the need for effecting corresponding changes in the forms of organization and forms of struggle. This is the most important

feature that should be taken into account in evolving appropriate tactics in each region or state and at each given time.

“Unless the CPI (Maoist) adopts a dialectical approach to the forms of struggle and forms of organization, the party is bound to fail in building effective mass organizations and powerful mass movements.” (CPI(Maoist), 2010). Mao (1945) pointed out, “War is the main form of struggle and army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as the mass organizations and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war: Before the outbreak of war, all organization and struggle are in preparation for war”.

The CPI(Maoist) documents (2009) echo the Maoist view that from the very beginning, the orientation, perspective and the method of building mass organizations and mass struggles should be to serve the preparation of war directly or indirectly. The CPI (Maoist) documents of (2010) reveal that the forms of mass organization and mass struggle change continuously with the advance of the armed struggle. Every advance made in armed struggle helps the mass organizations to expand and deepen their base and to advance the mass movement further.

The three types of mass organizations are firstly underground revolutionary mass organization, secondly open or semi-open revolutionary mass organization and thirdly mass organizations not directly linked to party. Where there are bans on the CPI (Maoist), the CPI (Maoist) plans to build cover organization and in other areas, the legal democratic organizations.

The CPI (Maoist) documents (2010) mention that the leadership of the mass organizations must always keep the politics of seizure of power in command, bring the vast masses to these politics by evolving the appropriate political slogan and rallying the masses around these. Attention must be paid on conducting wide political propaganda of the revolutionary politics through various means, namely open, semi-open and

secret type and concentrating on political exposures of the policies of the ruling classes, the anti-people nature of the parliament and the government, the attacks and atrocities on women, Dalits and adivasis (tribals), the persecution of the religious minorities, the suppression of the rights of the nationalities and the viciousness of the exploiting social system. It is possible to rally the vast masses if the correct tactical slogans are advanced in the appropriate time and forms of struggle and forms of organizations are evolved to take up such issues with the correct orientation.

CPI (Maoist) (2004) documents on strategy and tactics mention belief in establishing liberated zone and encircling cities from there and they refuse to believe in Indian independence saying that India still is semi colonial and semi feudal society and that a section of new landlords belong to the backward community and that the biggest enemy is the Comprador Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie (CBB) which include the capitalist, the bureaucrat, the big farmer, the rent collector, the finance capitalist and the international capitalist. There are two stages of establishment of people's Democracy and that the first stage is the new democratic revolution (NDR) and the second stage is the establishment of socialist state and while adopting a strength weakness opportunity thereat analysis, the Maoists feel that while the armed forces of the state are superior in quantity, they suffer from lack of motivation as only sacking and punishment makes them work terrain of India is mapped onto seven war zones with compatible strategies and maximum concentration is on the Dandakaryna area of Dantewara-Bastar belt of Chhattisgarh state.

The CPI(Maoist) in Dandakarnaya-Dantewada-Bastar belt of Chhattisgarh bordering Andhra Pradesh undertook the mass organizational work by constituting the following committees namely Vidya Committee(Education Committee), Fisheries Committee, Health Committee, Pranthiya Vyavasaya Sangam (Regional Business Association), Forest Protection Committee, Co-operative paddy banks or "Vanji" Societies, Panchayat


Committee, Credit Societies, Library Committee and Sports Committee.

The CPI (Maoist) document (2006) in the name of “New Peoples War in Dandakaranya” mentions the following that once feudal authority in Guerrilla zone is, to a large extent, smashed and people’s authority is being asserted, what is established is the first step towards the formation of a Base Area. A Base Area, besides certain military aspects, would (and must) necessarily have a self-sufficient economy for and without that, it can neither sustain itself, nor can it provide the ever growing needs of the party and people’s armed forces. The enemy seeks to crush a Base Area not only by the force of arms but even by economic blockades.

To deny the need for developing the new economy, in essence, denies the role of Base Areas in seizing power, as it will result in continuous military actions without the consolidation of people’s power in particular areas, those that have the potential to grow from primary level guerrilla zones, to higher levels of guerrilla zones and then finally to Base Areas”. The follow up action included the starting of “Praja Sanghams (Mass organizations) namely Dandakarnaya Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (DAKMS) for peasants, Kranthikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh (KAMS) for women, Kranti Kari Adivasi Bala Sangh (KABS) for children, Adivasi Kranthi Kari Chatra Sangh (AKCS) for students.

The resolutions of Central Regional Bureau of CPI(ML) PW on 17 December, 2002 were implemented in Dandakarnya special zonal committee (DKZSC), and Andhra Orissa Border Area Zonal Committee (AOBZSC) through the following steps which are, firstly formation of Guerrilla Base community by May 2003, secondly formation of another LGS, for covering all 100 the villages in Abuzmaad as the existing LGS covers only 35 to 40 villages, thirdly concentrating more on formation of village committees, fourthly formation of a Mahila team, fifthly continuing the existing medical team and planning formation of two schools, sixthly systemic planning of the agricultural development. The seventh step is enlightenment of people in

political and organizational matters and preparing them for struggle against the government, eighthly strengthening existing special guerrilla squad and planning of another SGS, the ninthly stopping the entry of enemy in Indravathi, Bambargadh, Dowla, Kakanal areas to attack the LGS. The tenth step is appointment of a progressive revolutionary to work in educational field and lastly establishment of RPCS on population basis and concentrating on developing militia. Weapon Manufacturing unit, printing press, medical team, mobile political school (MOPOS) were started simultaneously.



The CPI (Maoist) documents (2004) mention about starting agricultural development, co-operative movement, schools, hospitals, check dams in liberated areas to attract more support

of people and that urban city work must subordinate this rural agrarian revolutionary work.

The CPI (Maoist) desires to establish the people's democracy in India, first through democratic revolution in which the existing semi feudal, anti-working class government would be forcefully overthrown. The second stage is the establishment of socialist state. The CPI (Maoist) adopted the strategy of the protracted peoples' war (PPW) to educate the workers, peasants under a new 'non decadent' culture. The four phased strategical capture of political power for CPI (Maoist), is first through overthrowing the lawfully established government by means of PPW, building bases in rural areas to be eventually transformed into Guerrilla Zones (GZ), base areas and later into liberated areas and finally expanding the liberated areas in order to encircle urban areas to facilitate seizure of political power. The CPI (Maoist) desires to exploit the deeply engulfed economic and political crisis with no signs of recovery and the chronological political instability in almost all parts of India. The CPI (Maoist) prepared a seven point scale to identify areas of priority for application of time-tested strategies. The areas should be such where the feudal exploitation is at its worst, social, economic and political contradictions are intensifying, class struggle is sharpening, state or government is relatively weak, which has sufficient economic resources, where vast population is there and where vast forest area (mountains, hills, water bodies) spreading over thousands of square kilometers are there. Based on the above scale, the most important area according to CPI (Maoist) which fulfills most of the seven point criteria, is the zone comprising, Danda-Karanya (DK), Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Odisha Border (AOB), North Telangana (NT), Koel-Kaimur (KK). This area was selected by CPI (Maoist) as strategic area to build all these sub-areas into a continuous area for armed struggle with each sub-area influencing the other. This is reflected in Figure 1.2. On a similar note following seven strategic areas throughout the country were identified by the Polit Bureau of Central Committee (PB of CC) of CPI (Maoist) namely the Central India

comprising (NT, DK, AOB, Bihar and West Bengal) shown as first, the Western Ghats (Gujart to Kerala) shown as second, the Uttaranchal (Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Kashmir and Nepal) shown as third, the North East (North Bengal and North Eastern States of Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal, Mizoram, Meghalaya) shown as fourth, the Assam-Tripura belt shown as fifth, the western parts of Bihar and Bengal shown as sixth and the Bengal-Jharkhand-Odisha shown as seventh strategic area.

This is shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3.

<u>Guerrilla Zones</u>
NTSZC of AP
AOBSZC of AP & Odisha
DKSZC (South Ch.garh, Maharashtra, MP)
4) Nallamala in AP (now defunct)
5) North Chattisgarh
6) Gondia of Maharashtra
7) Koel- Kimor in B-J
8) Bengal-Jharkhand-Odisha
9) 3U- SAC (now 2U SAC)

Table 1.1: Guerrilla Zones

<u>Red Resistance Areas</u>
Karnataka
Northern Odisha
Haryana
Punjab

Table 1.2: Red Resistance Areas

After identifying the strategic area, the CPI (Maoist) takes up the social investigation through which the party studies the concrete form of exploitation, suppression, class analysis, class relations and decides friends and enemies. The social investigation includes the issues to be taken up for mobilizing the oppressed masses. When once social investigation is

completed, CPI (Maoist) goes for armed form of struggle from the very beginning since in these areas armed struggle with revolutionary violence is the principal form of struggle. Based on area identification and followed by identification of enemies and friends through social investigation, Guerrilla Zones (GZ) and Base Areas are formed in the strategic areas through the process of launching of GW. The following GZ and Red Resistance Areas (RRA) were identified by CPI (Maoist) in India. They are seen in the following Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 respectively.



The Sea routes in the coastal areas of the country, according to CPI (Maoist) can be put to use for GW and the CPI (Maoist) maintains transit nature of every victory or defeat accepting the reality of the non permanence nature of the liberated zone. Yet, even if for a shorter time, the CPI (Maoists) believes in a liberated zone for a strategic purpose in that the inhabitants of the liberated zone would feel the difference and hence eventually will come back to support the CPI (Maoist). The strategy is to use the liberated zones as shelter points for launching attacks on non liberated contagious zones and as places of retreat at the time of police attacks. The CPI (Maoist) dreams of implementing the agrarian revolution and establishing the people's democracy in the liberated areas so as to make an experience to enthuse the people suffering in other parts of the country. The CPI (Maoists) accords top priority for the sustenance in the liberated areas so that they can use the liberated area for a long time. The small and medium towns that fall in these liberated areas could be used for the propaganda work. The CPI (Maoist) aims at perfect implementation of the principle of modern management namely 'Structure follows the Strategy'. As part of the new strategy, the CPI (Maoists) first aims at organizing the peasants and the landless agriculture laborers for better wages and then aims at forming of militia groups from such support base. In this entire process, the CPI (Maoist) aims at maintaining the correct relationship among the four aspects namely **PISO** which means Propaganda, Investigation, Struggle, Organization.

1.8.7 Blue Print of Tactics

When once the Maoists succeed in strengthening their movement, they prepare a time bound blue print to start the PGA and the PLGA with the main task being converting of chosen base into real base. The CPI (Maoist) maintains that people should be involved in every stage since no base area can sustain without people's support. Hence the party starts people's militia at village levels, gradually then local guerrilla

squads, after the local resistance guerrilla squads and ultimately the village level defense squads are formed. From these Guerrilla squads, the Guerrilla Army recruitment gets commenced. The arms for the PGA are to be provided by snatching the same from the landlord, police and the paramilitary forces. To camouflage the entire organizational work, the support of frontal organizations like the organizations of the poets and the revolutionary writers, the balley dance troops is taken. The single point task of the PGA is the destruction of the political power of the state and the secondary task is the construction of people's political power.

The CPI (Maoist) developed a contingency plan to boost the morale of fighters in the event of police successes resulting in loosing a liberated zone. The frontal organizations and party would be doing the necessary motivating work. However, after the success of liberation, the PGA sheds its guerrilla character and becomes a professionally trained army in the name of PLA. The PGA and PLGA coupled with Revolutionary People's Committees (RPC) would be established in Guerrilla Zone and they would undertake the following politico-economic military tasks namely, overthrowing feudal authority, taking over the land of the landlords, building armed people's militia, stopping payment of taxes and levies, protecting the rights of tribals over forest land and produce and developing agriculture and cooperative movement. The above economic activities are confined to projects of limited gestation period whose main purpose is to win over the hearts and minds of people of liberated zones. The ultimate aim is to recruit some of the people for waging the PW.

While waging the people's war, CPI (Maoists) constantly evaluates the strength of the police forces and adopt concrete tactics to maximize their advantages by keeping the initiatives in their hands, since, they believe that loosing the initiative in a war means certain defeat. The CPI (Maoist) adopts different tactics to suit different conditions while their strategy remains the same for the entire country. In the forest areas, the CPI (Maoist) aims at waging PPW with an objective of seizure of

political power while choosing the forms of struggle, structure of the organization and types of slogans congenial to the different ground level realities in each area. The CPI (Maoist) does not forget the starting of the Guerrilla Army at any point of time. The CPI (Maoist) admits its disillusionment with the urban trade unions and feels that in the absence of revolutionary movement, the people's war will face many difficulties. The CPI (Maoist) rejects the insurrection tactics of Lenin and prefers to adopt the Maoist's strategy of encircling of the cities by the villages and thus the urban city work must remain always subordinate to the rural agrarian revolutionary work.

The following drawing explains the Maoist strategy of guerrilla, liberated zones and encirclement of cities in the Protracted People's War (PPW).




Figure 1.5: Phase-1- Guerrilla Bases-Guerrilla Zones




Figure 1.6: Phase-II Liberated Zones, Guerrilla Bases.

In the above figure, the PLA, the military wing of the CPI(Maoist), protects the Liberated Zone (LZ) vehemently from the attacks of security forces of the state and runs the Maoist government in the liberated zone. The liberated zone will not remain static rather the PLA will constantly strive to create more Guerrilla Bases (GB) in the targeted areas and after prolonged activity, the PLA will convert such newly created GBs into the Liberated Zones (LZ) and thus will keep on expanding the area of the liberated zone, so that by the year 2050, the entire country would be liberated.

The rural agrarian revolutionary work is attempted by the CPI (Maoist) through village government which is called Janatana Sarkar (People's Government). The people's government is aided by the RPCs, Grama Party Committee and the Party cell. These institutions are further assisted by the children's association, called Bal Sangham, the women's associations, called Mahila Sangham, the village protection squad, called Grama Rakshak Dal and area protection squad, called the Area Rakshak Dal. All the members of these various bodies are subdivided for multitasking through the following four grass root level committees with functional specialization namely the health committee called Vydyia committee, the education committee called Vidya committee, the development committee called Vikas committee and justice committee called Nyaya committee (Kindly see the video interview of surrendered Maoist Sirigirisetty Srinivasa Rao, enclosed). While simultaneously addressing the political-economic-administrative issues through various committees and institutions, the following tactical principles are adopted by the CPI (Maoist) to establish the New Democratic Revolution (NDR) of India. Firstly, use of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war and exterior-line operations within interior-line operation, secondly co-ordination with regular warfare, thirdly establishment of base areas, fourthly strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, fifthly development of guerrilla war into mobile warfare and lastly

correct relationship of command. The different phases of revolution are shown in the following Figure-1.7 and Figure 1.8.




Figure 1.7: Phases of Revolution




Figure 1.8: Liberated Phase

The CPI (Maoist) adopts entirely the 2300 BC classic “Art of War” by Sun Tzu., when the party’s central military commission follows the following tactics.

“When the enemy advances, withdraw
When he camps, harass
When he tires, strike,
When he retreats, pursue”

“Make noise in the east and attack in the west”

Apart from PGA, PLGA, the CPI (Maoist) maintains frontal organizations and mass organizations who act as conveyor belts between general people and the CPI (Maoist). Being a professional revolutionary party, the CPI (Maoist) aims to maintain distinct separation between the two wings of the party namely the full time professionals and the part time frontal organizers. The CPI (Maoists) maintains that utmost secrecy is a must in the party. The CPI (Maoists) supporters do not believe in the separation of legal and illegal methods and openly plead for co-ordination of legal and ill-legal activity.

1.8.8 Military Offensive of CPI (Maoist)

The CPI (Maoist) does indulge in the following offences of the Indian penal code (IPC) namely kidnappings, raids on police stations, ambushes using weapons/landmines, raids on explosive magazines, raids on police camps/sites, attacks on Railways/Central government properties, attacks on Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs), ambushes of patrolling parties, attacks on banks, attacks on jails and ambushes of escort parties.

The CPI (Maoists) desires to devise tactics in order to concentrate on organizing the masses of various classes into revolutionary mass organization and to form a national democratic front to aid spread of the PLA and to extend the influence of the political activity of the party. According to the CPI (Maoists), the main reason for the formation of the united front is to poach the supporters of other organizations. Mass organization is a powerful weapon to convince the masses and

instill confidence in them to liberate themselves from all oppression and exploitation through collective organization and struggle. Mass organizations compliment the CPI (Maoists) and become indispensable in the consolidation of the support base of the party and work as a recruiting agency for the hard core members of the party.

The Naxal Management Division (NMD) of MHA, Government of India (GOI) in year 2010 mentions how the CPI(Maoist) is spreading its influence. "Maoist Movement is because of retreat of civil governance." (Sahni, 2001).

Increasing number of incidents of violence including killing of security personnel, looting of weapons, murdering civilian population, blasting railway stations, primary health centers, primary schools, obstructing road construction, levying taxes, collecting bribes from contractors and industrialist, killing the people's representatives like Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA), Member of Parliament (MP) and other illegal incidents are indicative of failure or retreat of governance. The following Figure 1.9 and tables namely Table -1.3 and Table-1.4 indicate the year wise occurrence of such incidents in AP and also in the Maoist Movement affected states of India.




Figure 1.9: Naxalite Violence and Casualties

Table 1.3: State Wise Left Wing Extremist Violence Incidents (Deaths)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Andhra Pradesh	736 (205)	602 (151)	425 (113)	461 (180)	346 (96)	577 (139)	310 (74)	535 (208)	212 (52)	132 (48)	96 (43)	62 (17)	100 (24)	34 (9)
Jharkhand	185 (90)	267 (176)	318 (193)	355 (200)	353 (157)	342 (117)	379 (169)	312 (119)	310 (124)	482 (157)	364 (147)	742 (208)	501 (157)	515 (182)
Chhattisgarh	143 (51)	76 (37)	79 (48)	105 (37)	304 (55)	256 (74)	352 (83)	385 (168)	715 (388)	582 (369)	453 (165)	529 (290)	625 (343)	458 (202)
Bihar	188 (116)	214 (202)	278 (170)	169 (111)	239 (117)	250 (128)	323 (171)	186 (96)	107 (45)	135 (67)	125 (60)	232 (72)	307 (97)	313 (64)
Maharashtra	43 (13)	40 (15)	35 (11)	34 (7)	83 (29)	75 (31)	84 (15)	94 (53)	98 (42)	94 (25)	54 (20)	154 (93)	94 (45)	109 (54)
Odisha	11 (5)	5 (-)	15 (3)	30 (11)	68 (11)	49 (15)	35 (8)	42 (14)	44 (9)	67 (17)	71 (58)	266 (67)	218 (79)	192 (33)
West Bengal	3 (1)	4 (3)	4 (2)	9 (4)	17 (7)	6 (1)	11 (15)	14 (7)	23 (17)	32 (6)	27 (23)	255 (158)	350 (258)	90 (41)
Madhya Pradesh	36 (8)	19 (10)	7 (4)	21 (2)	17 (3)	13 (1)	13 (4)	20 (3)	6 (1)	9 (2)	6 (-)	- (-)	7 (1)	8 (0)

Source: State Intelligence bureau, Andhra Pradesh and MHA, Government of India.

Table 1.4: Extremist Violence in Police Operations

Parameters	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (09.03. 2010)
No. of Incidents	576	212	132	96	62	9
No. of murders (No. of deaths)	166(211)	43(52)	40(48)	37(43)	15(17)	1(1)
Policemen Killed	25	11	4	1 (+33=45)**	17	1
Extremists killed	186	41	44	42 (+33=45)**	17	1
No. of Exchanges of Fire with Police	162	101	49	28	13	2
No. of attacks on Police by Naxalites (including Lang mines)	40	19	11	1	1	-
Arms snatched from police by extremists	11	3	-	1	-	-
No. of extremists arrested	938	763	1142	462	336	71

No. of extremists surrendered	894	321	214	208	91	33
No. of Arms recovered	526	316	251	170	81	5
Jan Adalats held by Naxalites	-	-	-	-	-	-
Training Camps organized by extremists	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attacks on railway Stations/Property	4	3	1	1	-	-
Property damaged (Rs. In lakhs)	1088.26	618.04	461.64	45.60	238.05	56.82

* Balimela 37 (Inspectors -2, Sub-Inspectors -3, Head Constables -5, Police Constables-24, Home Guards-3)

Table 1.5: Comparative Analysis of Important Parameters of naxal violence during 2007 to 2011

S/No	Parameters	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
A.	No. of Incidents	1565	1591	2258	2213	1745
B.	Civilian Killed (Out of which Police informers killed)	460	490 170	591 211	720 323	464 216
C.	No. of Security Forces killed	236	231	317	285	142
D.	No. of encounters with Police	276	271	309	272	223
E.	No. of attacks on Police (including Lang mines)	182	192	250	230	131
F.	No. of Naxalites killed (during encounters as well as attacks on Police)	141	199	219	172	99

G.	No. of Naxalites arrested	1456	1743	1981	2916	1972
H.	No. of Naxalites surrendered	390	400	150	266	393
I.	Total no. of arms snatched	233	1219	217	256	67
J.	No. of Arms recovered	352	1511	572	642	624
K.	Arms training camps held	48	52	61	94	84
L.	No. of Jan Adalats held	68	71	50	75	96

Table 1.6: State wise Statistics of Various Indices of Naxal Violence for the 2011 vis a vis 2010

Sl No	State	No of incidence	No of Civilians Killed	No of Security Forces killed	No of encounters with police	No of attacks police (including Landmines)	No of Naxalites Killed (excluding water & attacks)	No of Naxalites arrested	No of naxalites surrendered	Total No of arms snatched	Total No of arms recovered	Arms Training Camps held	No of Jan Adalats held
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
1	Andhra Pradesh	54 (100)	9 (24)	0 (0)	6 (14)	1 (2)	4 (13)	150 (289)	242 (141)	0 (0)	24 (48)	0 (0)	8 (3)
2	Bihar	313 (307)	61 (72)	3 (25)	17 (20)	13 (24)	14 (5)	426 (364)	26 (13)	4 (61)	159 (59)	12 (1)	16 (18)
3	Chhattisgarh	458 (625)	122 (171)	80 (172)	99 (126)	75 (125)	34 (83)	504 (902)	20 (6)	29 (109)	108 (122)	24 (1)	13 (14)
4	Jharkhand	515 (501)	149 (132)	33 (25)	42 (57)	23 (26)	16 (15)	377 (359)	17 (23)	17 (15)	165 (217)	24 (9)	54 (26)
5	Maharashtra	109 (94)	44 (132)	10 (10)	20 (7)	7 (14)	3 (3)	92 (76)	15 (22)	1 (0)	12 (27)	7 (4)	0 (0)
6	MP	8 (7)	0 (0)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	6 (0)	0 (2)	1 (1)	12 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)

7	Odisha	192 (215)	39 (62)	14 (17)	21 (10)	9 (21)	23 (10)	148 (247)	49 (48)	10 (4)	68 (32)	7 (10)	3 (10)
8	Uttar Pradesh	1 (6)	0 (1)	0 (0)	0 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	13 (77)	9 (1)	0 (0)	2 (26)	0 (0)	0 (0)
9	West Bengal	90 (350)	39 (223)	2 (35)	18 (34)	2 (16)	5 (42)	223 (536)	15 (6)	0 (63)	74 (110)	10 (12)	1 (4)
10	Other	5 (5)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0(1)	1 (2)	0 (1)	33 (66)	0 (4)	5 (3)	0 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)
	Total	1745 (2213)	464 (720)	142 (285)	225 (272)	131 (250)	99 (172)	1972 (2916)	395 (266)	67 (256)	624 (642)	84 (94)	96 (75)

Sahni (2004) pointed out that according to the Maoist press release namely "Urban perspective document", the Maoists have plan to draw students and urban unemployed youth into their ranks. The CPI (Maoist), identified two principal industrial belts as targets for urban mobilization namely Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-Kolkata and Mumbai-Pune-Surat-Ahmedabad. The CPI (Maoist) adopts suitable tactics to convert any burning issue to its favour in order to spread venom against the state and noted that, "Covert organizations are indispensable in areas where our mass organizations are not allowed to function openly". This strategy has been followed in caste conflict in Kairlanji and during the movement against displacement at Singur of West Bengal or Kalinga Nagar of Odisha and in the month of May 2010, at G.K. Veedhi-Chinta Palli area against Bauxite mining in AP.

The CPI (Maoist) strategy is very clear in that it intends to build a "huge movement against displacement and the very model of development itself and through uniting all "genuine democratic and anti-imperialist forces to create a tornado of dissent that forces the rulers to stop this juggernaut."(CPI (Maoist) documents, 2004) .

The Maoist strategy of using all crises has been put to use in all Maoist movement affected states as an integral component of strategy of political consolidation, leading to

military mobilization since, according to CPI (Maoist), these 'struggles' create the networks and recruitment base for the Maoist militia and armed cadres. "Maoist strategy exploits the vulnerabilities of constitutional governance and its freedoms to the hilt, and the security apparatus has only limited instrumentalities of containment available in the initial stages of subversion and mass mobilization." (Sahni, 2001). The economic growth rate of a country is also contingent on the way it governs itself." (Narayana, 2004). 'Today, the state (of Andhra Pradesh) stands as the best example of the success of counter-revolutionary strategies of a government.' (Frontline report, 2009).

MAOIST ACTIVITIES IN ODISHA




Figure 1.10: Maoist Activities in Odisha

1.9 CPI (Maoist) in Odisha

The CPI (Maoist) has their influence over 12 (Twelve) of the State's existing 30 (Thirty) districts and are already active in 08 (Eight) namely : Gajapati, Rayagada, Koraput and Malkangiri (in the Southern region) and Sundergarh, Sambalpur, Deogarh and Keonjhar (in the Northern Odisha). Presently, the total number of Party Cadre in Odisha is 200 (Two Hundred).




Figure 1.11: Map of AOB SZC

1.10 Maoist Activities in Chhattisgarh

The following Maps indicates the presence of Maoist activities in Chhattisgarh.




Figure 1.12: Maoists Activities in Chhattisgarh

MAP OF AOB SZC



Figure 1.13: DK SZC

1.11 Maoist Pan-Indian Strategy (Military Strategies)

The following are the Military strategies adopted by the Maoist:

- (a) Forming armed militia platoons to target the security forces during combing operations by planning booby traps, landmines, etc.
- (b) Utilizing mass base of other ML groups and suing to their advantage, the differences among the groups.
- (c) Creating unrest in bordering areas of Odisha, invite/trap and hit security forces.
- (d) Taking mass shield, particularly of women during raids and cordon & search operations.
- (e) Forming Special Action Teams and commit sensational actions.

The CRC (Central Regional Command) Company of the Maoist is formed basically to organize multiple/mass raids and hitting the Security Forces, who are conducting Combing Operations against the Maoist. For this purpose, they adopt the following Tactics:

- (a) They move in platoon strength during night times.
- (b) They maintain food dumps.
- (c) They communicate through VHF
- (d) They lay in ambush for days together.
- (e) They put flanks for the ambush party.
- (f) They prepare for a lengthy battle.
- (g) They assault and kill the injured even after the ambush
- (h) They lure the Security Forces; invite them into their ambush and for that they wait for days together.

1.12 Advantages and Disadvantages of CRC Company

The following are the advantages of the CRC Company:

- (a) Their morale is high as their number is high.
- (b) The Balimela incident has strengthened their morale.
- (c) Their large show of strength is a motivate to tribal

- youth and there is scope for large scale recruitment.
- (d) They sit in ambushes extending to 1-2 Km for days together.
 - (e) To counter such huge formation, the strength of Police party must be high which will get exposed at the very beginning of the movement.

1.13 The following are the disadvantages of the CRC Company

- (a) The huge formation will easily get exposed.
- (b) Difficult to maintain secrecy as they move in large numbers.
- (c) They are successful only in their "Base Areas".
- (d) Procuring food and logistics is very important which again act as a hindrance for large numbers.
- (e) They have to communicate among themselves-scope for interception.
- (f) Their Advance and retreat will be slow.
- (g) Their Losses/causalities will be heavy.
- (h) The Coy needs followers to carry heavy luggage.
- (i) They Lack proper Command and Control.

PART-B

1.14 Problems Statement and Definition of Terms Definitions

Systematic Analysis means an unbiased identification of problems in a particular area of study and compiling with it the study of those effecting *prima facie*, the element of field of study so as to discover logical connection among all these factors.

Training can be described as "the acquisition of skills, concepts or attitudes that result in improved performance within the job environment". Training analysis looks at each aspect of an operational domain so that the initial skills, concepts and attitudes of the human elements of a system can

be effectively identified and appropriate training can be specified.

1.15 Process of Training Analysis

- (a) Task analysis (of new modified system)
- (b) Identification of training gap
- (c) Statement of training requirement
- (d) Assessment of training options
- (e) Cost benefit analysis of training options

1.16 Training Needs Analysis

Definition: According to Jean Barbazette, Training needs analysis is defined as the “identification of training requirements and the most cost effective means of meeting those requirements”.

Jean Barbazette is the founder of The Training Clinic, Seal Beach, California, (a training consulting firm) began in 1977.

The Training Clinic is the leading “Train-the-Trainer” company in the United States. The Training Clinic conducts needs assessments, designs training programs, develops lesson plans, self-paced learning packages, games and simulations, and presents seminars on over 30 different topics. Workshops include Training Trainers, Communications, Management and Supervision, Interpersonal Skills, Sales and Customer Service and Administrative Assistant Effectiveness.

Through field staff of 18 present in-house workshops nationally on the techniques of train-the-trainer each year. The Training Clinic presents some of its workshops in Europe and Latin America through licensees. Jean recently presented train-the-trainer and management workshops in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. She is an active national and local member of ISPI, SHRM and ASTD.

She has a master’s degree in education from Stanford University. She’s the author of the bestselling book Successful New Employee Orientation (Pfeiffer, 2007) and the Trainer’s Support Handbook (McGrawhill, 2001).

1.17 Lewin's Cyclic Model




Figure 1.14

This cyclic model of problem identification, therapeutic action and evaluation can be divided into seven substages.

1.18 Critical Incidents Study

The following are the critical incidents study arising from the naxalites attacks on the following:

- (a) On Security forces
- (b) Politicians
- (c) State Police Organizations
- (d) Their own Cadres
- (e) Non-Police Establishments
- (f) Central Government Establishments like BSNL Towers, FCI God owns etc;

For example, the bank dacoity at Wazedu District of Khammam, A.P and the appropriate response of Police Organisations.

2

Research Design of The Study

2.1. Introduction

Training needs Analysis (TNA) in case of Police Organization require firstly the need identification, which in turn requires the study of present level of performance of training inputs and expected level of performance. Here expected level clearly means the matching level of the challenges to Internal Security.

The need identification is done at two levels. The First level is at performance level and the gap here is maintained as Gap-I. Performance is proposed to be measured at three levels namely (a) Organizational level (b) Team level (C) Individual level.

When it comes to specific Units/individual/Core teams, there is the second gap which is portrayed as Gap-II which exists between actual level of performance and anticipated level of performance. Here the emphasis would be on the Pro-active nature of individual member/team/lean organization. Every Police organization now in India, facing LWE threat, have different Specialized groups like Counter Insurgency Force (in West Bengal), Grey Hounds (in Andhra Pradesh), Special Operations Force (in Odisha), Special Task Force etc. Here too, within the overall framework, the multi tier differentiation is relevant namely at (a) Organizational level (b) Team Level (c) Individual level. The following figure explains these two gaps.




Figure 2.1: Training Gaps

AA indicates the present level of performance.

xx indicates the expected level of performance.

YY indicated the anticipated level of performance.

Views of the old and continuing members of force who underwent training in the past would put on the pedestal (a) the individual views of training (b) evaluation of past TNA and (c) the then leader’s vision of training needs (if any) and such a pedestal is the bench mark for any TNA of the present. The vision of other stake holders too is important especially the logistics, governance, budgetary process, infrastructure facilities provider, the general opinion makers and the vulnerable groups.

The following is the approaches of TNA which is used as part of the methodology. Questionnaires were designed to check up the response regarding the specific training needs, knowledge and skills deficits both in (a) Competency Study and (b) Task analysis. Questionnaire design also takes care of performance analysis in terms of the following specifics:

How does the job impact organizational performance?

What tasks are required to be performed for improvement in the organizational efficiency?

What specific set knowledge/skills is required to be imparted?

2.2 Model of Training Process and Sources of Training Needs

While conducting the survey the following conceptual models of training were used :




Figure 2.2



Figure 2.3. Sources of Training Needs

2.3 Objectives of The Research Study

The following were the objectives of research project.

2.3.1. To study the present skill levels of Police Forces deployed in CPI (Maoist) area.

2.3.2. To identify the skill requirements for facing major tactical & strategic challenges.

2.3.3. To study the response mechanism of Maoists in terms of competitor analysis.

2.3.4. To make implementable suggestions for tangible improvement in the performance of state police forces.

2.3.5 To suggest training interventions based on the findings of the study.

2.4 Research Questions

To address the above objectives, the following research questions were to be answered :

- 1) What is the present level of skills being imparted at Training Centers aimed at fighting LWE?
- 2) What are the major strategies and tactics that Maoist deploy in order to achieve their objectives?
- 3) What are the deficits at the strategy/tactics levels between Maoist and training colleges?
- 4) What are the changes that can be brought out to improve the performance of training colleges?

2.5 Statement of Problem

The Research Problem was worded as under:

“Training Needs of Police Personnel in Naxalite Prone Areas of Chhattisgarh and Odisha”

2.6 Sample of Study

Adequate Samples were taken fulfilling statistical rigour.

2.7 Research Methodology

Following research methodology was used for data collection–

- I. Focus Group Discussions
- II. Structured Interview
- III. Observation
- IV. Analysis of Critical Incidents

2.8 Statistical Analysis of Data

Following statistical tests were used for data collection:

- I. χ^2 Chi Square Test
- II. Regression Analysis
- III. Content Analysis of Qualitative data

2.9 Definitions of Terms

Systematic Analysis means an unbiased identification of problems in a particular area of study and compiling with it the study of those effecting prima facie, the element of field study so as to discover logical connection among all these factors.

Training can be described as “the acquisition of skills, concepts or attitudes that result in improved performance within the job environment”. Training analysis looks at each aspect of an operational domain so that the initial skills, concepts and attitudes of the human element of a system can be effectively identified and appropriate training can be specified.

Training Needs Analysis

According to Jean Barbazette, Training needs analysis is defined as the “identification of training requirements and the most cost effective means of meeting those requirements”.

2.10 Delimitations of The Study

The study had the following delimitations :

The study was restricted to two Naxalite Prone States only.

Critical incident analysis and focus group discussions were used for analysis of data.

3

Training Needs Assessment Through Analysis of Critical Incidents

3.1 Critical Incidents Analysis

The literature (classified) seized from CPI (Maoist) Cadres are studied and they are analyzed from the point of competitor analysis. There are four such Case Studies from Chhattisgarh, Odisha area. The detailed analysis done by Maoist think-tank is reprinted below. Discussion on this would be presented under head 3.6 and 3.7.

3.2 Review of Ambush at Vill. Minupa: South Bastar Division, Chattisgarh

Date: 10/04/2009

Location: Padda gudem, vill:Minupa, Jegurugonda Area, South Bastar Division

Strength of enemy: Around 111 police personnel (The first police party of 51 and Reinforcements in 3 Batches app 60 personnel)

Weaponry with enemy: A K-47, INSAS, S. L.R, .303, 12 BORE etc

Own strength: Two companies including both Main and secondary troops

Main objective: While the main aim is to boycott the farce Loksabha elections and to send a message to the government,

the secondary objective is to eliminate the police personnel coming on election duty and snatching their weapons and effecting on their moral.

Plan: To achieve success as decided in the meeting at the South sub Zonal Command, Platoons from the three main operational units in the area and the secondary local sub units gathered at a place near Jegurugonda area.

Execution: Information came from the local sources about the presence of security personnel at P.S. Chintguppa and their plans to visit all the areas where the polling booths are to be established for the Loksabha elections. After making a detailed plan on the execution of ambush on the patrolling parties of the police that may visit vill. MINUPA, it was decided where to place the ambush troops. While some of the troops were getting ready after bath and other personnel were in preparatory way a message came from the militia that some troops were seen moving towards vill Minupa and the villagers at Paddamgudem ran away from their houses after enquires by the security personnel. Immediately both the Core group and order group about the action plan and decided to place an ambush and alerted all the earmarked platoons. While one platoon of PLGA immediately left , discussed the other troops left after 10 minutes in a planned way.

When the PLGA platoon reached the Paddamgudem (hamlet) and enquired about the security forces the locals conveyed that troops left towards vill. MINUPA a little before. Our PLGA Platoon planned to follow them after enquiring from the locals about the activities of the troops at Paddamgudem. While they were interacting with villagers in their houses, information came about the movement of security forces returning from the vill. MINUPA towards Paddamgudem on the way back to P.S., Chintaguppa. PLGA platoon commander sensing the danger (as the complete strength of the platoons have not yet reached) and if exposed to the Enemy security forces there may be serious course, he decided to take the platoon out of the village and to hide closely to watch the movements till the other PLGA platoons

reached the area. The commander sensed that enemy security forces may pass through the main road of the village and if encountered chances of being surrounded by forces and anticipating the imminent danger, ordered the platoon to immediately retreat to a safe zone away from the village. But the security forces smelled the movement and they started firing at our comrades.

Within a few minutes, our other guerilla troops reached and engaged the Enemy forces from two different sides while one platoon placed them parallel to already engaged platoon, the other one crossed to the other side of the road and engaged the security forces cutting the escape routes. When fire came from both sides and enemy forces puzzled and retreated into the houses nearby, enemy started firing indiscriminately on our guerillas by making holes to the walls of the houses and from roof tops. As the surrounding areas of the houses where enemy took shelter were plain and there was no cover, our troops could not go close to the houses.

Within few minutes after the encounter started the police party commander flashed a message to the Chintaguppa P.S about the ambush and requested for reinforcements. Immediately a batch left on foot from P.S. Chintaguppa and two batches left from Dornapal with a gap 30 m between them on motor cycles. While the first QRT of 16 persons on 8 motor cycles, wearing bullet proof jackets and modern weapons headed by Dy.comdt Diwakar Tiwari rushed to the spot, the second QRT of 20 personnel of STF police left on 10 motor cycles. The first QRT led by Dy comdt crossed the party coming on foot from P.S. Chintaguppa and left the motor cycles on the junction towards vill.Paddamme gudem and by opening heavy fire tried to run close into the houses where the enemy security troops were cornered.

The two guerilla platoons placed close to the junction were startled about the sudden presence of reinforcements from enemy troops and their rapid and aggressive firing on the gureillas. While one guerilla platoon tried to change their place to take more cover, the other platoon moved was close to the

nearby houses to take cover where the other guerilla platoon already engaged in fire with enemy troops. By the change of the positions of these two platoons the enemy troops got a clear passage and moved in more aggressively. One guerilla platoon already engaged in fire on the aggressive attack by the reinforcements of enemy troops retreated from the scene. The commander of that platoon Comrade Babu and few more comrades engaged with the enemy troops were injured in the fire. Few troops ditched and left from the scene comrade Babu became helpless as the fire and aggression from the enemy was heavy. Immediately he flashed a message to the coy commander about the situation and the need for reinforcements.

The information was immediately shared by the company commander with Battalion commander and the Battalion commander visualizing the imminent danger sent the reinforcements from the other company with the direction to help and assist the PLGA commander in retreating from the scene. Comrade Babu along with other guerillas fighting with enemy troops the support troops and reinforcements attacked the enemy troops from the back valiantly. In the exchange of fire and in the gun battle 12 enemy troops were killed and 16 enemy troops were injured .Our guerillas captured AK-47s-3,INSAS-3,GREANDES-2,Bullet proof jackets-6 and 2 wireless communication sets.

Meanwhile, the other enemy reinforcements (team came on foot from Chintakuppa and QRT of STF) reached the spot and while retaliating with our guerillas trying to save the other security personnel, were trapped in the houses. After discussing the situation with company commanders, the Battalion Commander ordered to retreat from the scene. The trapped platoon commander Comrade Babu, Section commander Comrade Dasru and Comrade Rinku laid down their lives in the firing by additional reinforcements of enemy and we were unable to bring their bodies. Company deputy commander Comrade Chandu who tried to attack the enemy initially in the ambush like in a raid also laid down his life

while trying to administer the medication and all the guerilla troops retreated with his body.

ENEMY SIDE

No of rounds enemy fired: more than 2000 rounds

Losses for the enemy: 11CRPF personnel including a Deputy Comdt. were killed and 16 got injured.

Own losses: 4 Comrades laid down their lives and 4 injured

Captured weapons: AK47- 3, INSAS-3, BP JACKETS-6, GREANDES-2, WIRELESS SETS-2

Lost weapons: AK47-1, WIRELESS SETS-2, Rs25, 000 cash

POSITIVE POINTS

1. Major casualty for enemy and psychological attack on their moral.
2. Around 70 to 80 polling booths were removed and relocated in police camps.
3. Public could boycott the elections without any fear.
4. The reinforcement troops who came like heroes were killed while the trapped troops saved themselves. It was a good lesson for the reinforcement troops in future
5. Even after the reinforcements came in itself were our Guerillas able to attack and eliminate them. This was is an achievement.

NEGATIVE POINTS

1. The first PLGA platoon exposed to the enemy firing started running between the houses in the village. Otherwise we could have trapped them in the plain areas and casualties would have been more for the enemy.
2. As we know that P.S Chintaguppa Police station is just 5 kms away should have anticipated the reinforcements our stop parties should have been established before.

3. We should have kept medicines in reserve at Company locations also in addition to at Battalion Head Quarter.
4. Wastage of many rounds in firing and firing without aiming.

3.3 Review of Mandagiri Oppourtinity Ambush

Date of incident: 10/05/2009

Time of incident: 1745 hrs to 1945 hrs

Location of incident: Between vill. Mandagiri and vill. Sunbahara (Minepur division), Distt Dhanthari, Chhattisgarh

Strength of enemy: 47 Special police troops

Weapons of enemy: AK-47, SLR, INSAS and GRENADES

Strength of PLGA: Initially one Geruaila Company and one more coy joined an hour latter.

Weapons of PLGA: All types of auto and semi auto including mines and Grenades.

AIM: To strengthen the PLGA in the recently expanded Minepur division by attacking and killing the police personnel and snatching their weapons in retaliation to police pressure on the public in the area and to counter the attacks on the geruailas of PLGA in the broader spectrum of expansion of PLGA in gaining the support from the local public for the cause .By these attacks gaining the sympathy of the public and slowly involving them in the movement.

Reece and site selection: With the aim to attack the police personnel the Core group and Order group specially appointed for this purpose sent a team to conduct reccee and selection of site. The team selected a place on the road connecting NAGARI and RISSGAON between the vill Mandagiri and Sonbahara.

Planning: Keeping the advantage of the terrain, two ambush parties be placed on both sides of the road and depending upon the mode of transport whether police troops moving on foot or in vehicles from any direction stop parties placed at both edges (Nagari side and Risgaon side) will attack and the remaining parties will engage and neutralize the

enemy troops. The other strategy of exploding the vehicles and attacking them were also planned and accordingly two mines were placed one with Chief commander at main ambush site and second mine with assault team placed towards Risgaon (Map-1). In case reinforcement comes second ambush party placed at a distance of 2 kms from the main ambush site towards Nagari will engage.

Rehearsals: After selection of site and planning of ambush, teams were selected according to the terrain and rehearsals were conducted for two days.

Execution: On that day i.e. 10/05/09 there was a village fair at Risgaon and public from the near-by villages started pouring in from the morning. Anticipating this situation, the ambush parties placed themselves in position by 0600hrs till 1700 hrs. There was a rally planned by the local leaders against the government apathy for the problems of the villagers and huge public gathered by 2 pm for the rally. The organizers of the rally cancelled it, anticipating the police action and arrests at the last minute. This information was shared by the scouts to the ambush party. While the core group comrades were discussing about the plans the scouts also informed that the police parties reached there in three vehicles and arrested few farmers there and picked them in their vehicles and left the place. The scouts also informed that the whereabouts of the police is not known. As already it became 1700 hrs and evening the core group discussed and decided to leave the site of ambush and planned to lay ambush the next morning. Accordingly, the ambush parties placed on the side of the road were withdrawn and latter the parties at the main ambush site also withdrew from the site. After few minutes the scouts informed that police parties in three vehicles left Risgaon towards Nagari on the planned route.

Immediately the available Core group Comrades discussed the situation and tried to contact the comrades, but they could not be contacted. Then they could be not the ambush party positioned at a distance of 2 kms (they also already left the place) and briefed about the situation and movement of the

police parties in three vehicles. The Core group Comrades also told that the main ambush party is on the way back to original place and incase the enemy vehicles crosses the site, asked the second ambush party to explode the vehicles and engage the enemy troops. It was also ordered by the commander that whom so ever (ambush parties or other teams) reaches their place, first they should engage the enemy troops By time other troops can join and eliminate the enemy troops.

In a little time few teams reached close to the ambush site and crossed the road to reach their own positions. Mean while one police vehicle negotiating the road saw the movement of one team crossing the road and slowed down their vehicle. Immediately without giving any chance to the enemy troops in getting down the vehicle the team close to the place opened fire and engaged them. (map-2 of the ambush). Mean while the second police vehicle moving at a distance reached close to the main ambush site and the team which had already reached there exploded the mines placed. But the vehicle narrowly escaped and stopped. Few enemy troops got injured because of the of the explosion impact, but the enemy jumped out of the vehicle took positions and started retaliating. The other two enemy vehicles moving behind and away from killing zone sensed the danger, stopped their vehicles and took cover to save them. As no ambush team reached that area the enemy troops easily took position and covered themselves.

Meanwhile the teams who left the area and reached the administration area, after hearing the gun shots tried to contact the Head-Quarters and after confirmation and orders from there they quickly approached the ambush site to assist the fighting Comrades as per the directions given. The other teams which had left the Head-Quarters on some other duty also heard the firing shots and contacted the base and as per the directions they reached the ambush site to assists the Comrades.

In the meantime the Comrades who attacked the first police vehicle were able to kill the enemy and snatched their weapons and cleared the vehicle while second enemy vehicle was

engaged by the other Comrades at a little distance. H.Qrs directed the first teams to move ahead and assist the other Comrades already engaged with second enemy vehicle. As the pressure increased on the enemy, the enemy retreated from the area and reached the other police troops in the third vehicle, who were a little behind and started firing at our Comrades. The teams left from the administration area and other teams who were directed also reached close to enemy while already engaged Comrades were in action. The enemy troops were trapped in our Comrades teams but as it had already become dark and coordination between the PLGA teams were lacking and one team commander was also injured, H.Qrs after consultations with the PLGA commanders on ground decided to give space to the demoralized enemy to flee from the scene. H.Qrs also ordered to search the area after they flee from there and snatch the weapons from the killed and seriously injured enemies and recover their belongings. After searching a weapon was found from the dead enemy as the other injured enemy troops fled from the area. After burning all the three enemy vehicles PLGA Comrades retreated from the area.

Losses to the enemy: 13 special task police personnel including a driver were killed and 18 injured.

Losses to PLGA: One PLGA Comrade got minor injuries.

Recoveries from enemy: AK47-3, SLR-3, INSAS-2, GRENADES-7, WIRELESS SETS 2, MOBILE PHONES-6 Base set-1, live rounds-386

Positive Points

1. Selection of site, planning of operation, commanding of various teams, communication between the teams and coordination was very good
2. As the ambush was successful in the new areas of expansion of base for PLGA and gaining the support from the local public was easy. Enemy troops had to re-establish in the area of deployment.
3. As the incident occurred at a distance of 100 kms from

Raipur the ruling machinery will be insecure for their physical security.

4. We are able to successfully eliminate the enemy in our expansion to the new areas.

Lessons

1. Need to learn the skills in night combat without cross firing and own losses.
2. PLGA has to upgrade night combat skills to inflict maximum losses to the enemy.

Accordingly PLGA guerillas planned to place themselves at the river bed close to Kishtaram and depending on the movement of Koya commandoes action plan implemented.

EXECUTION: As planned PLGA troops reached the river bed close to Kishtaram by 0700 hrs and took positions. But the information about the movement of Koya Commandoes reached only after an hour and actual position was not traceable. As per the information available Koya commandoes while leaving Kishtaram said that they were on the way to meet Company-3. As we anticipated Koya commandoes first raided the village Palod and harassed the people. They looted all gold, silver ornaments extracted money and many other house hold items from the villagers. They also beat women in the village. By the time information reached to our PLGA troops the Koya Commandoes already left the village and moved towards village Bhutal. Our troops verifying the movements of the enemy moved tactically towards Village Bhutal. Mean time militia Comrades conveyed that the Koya Commandoes were approaching towards the PLGA troops and had came very close to them.

Immediately after receiving the information our PLGA troops restructured the movement pattern and decided to move ahead in Battalion formation. The movement of the Koya commandoes was also seen from a distance. Our troops were stationed in good cover and decided to attack the enemy in a tactical manner. There was a big hillock on one side and a

reservoir on the other side of the path between our troops and the enemy troops. We expected that the enemy troops may move ahead by negotiating both the hillock and reservoir from the flanks but the enemy troops moved ahead in flanks of the reservoir only leaving the hillock aside.

With the unexpected move, PLGA commanders sent two sections from a PLGA company towards the right side of the reservoir and they immediately opened the fire on the enemy troops. By that time even the enemy troops were not in killing zone and the enemy quickly appreciating the danger stopped the movement and took positions. Orders were issued to the coy on right




Figure 3.1




Figure 3.2

3.4 Review of Opportunity Ambush on Koya Commando Police Troops

DATE: 17/05/2009

TIME : At around 1230 hrs in the noon

PLACE: At vill. Palod near Kishtaram, Kunta block

DISTRICT: Dantewada, Chattisgarh

ENEMY STRENGTH: 144 Koya Commandoes and C.R.P.F personnel

ENEMY WEAPONS: AK-47, LMG, INSAS and SLRs

OUR STRENGTH: Three coys of PLGA

OUR WEAPONS: Both auto and semi auto weapons

OUR AIM: Since Jan 09 Koya commando are creating terror in the areas of Kishtaram and in Kunta blocks. On 8th Jan Koya Commandoes killed 18 villagers at village Singaram. In the month of March they raided the village Bhutal and looted public. They are harassing the public in many ways, arresting them, beating them and looting. PLGA commanders decided to attack the Koya commandoes to reduce their atrocities on the public and to eliminate them to achieve

supremacy over the area. It was decided to attack them and teach a lesson to them, otherwise the Koya commando's will dominate the area.

PLAN: On 16th of May PLGA commandoes attacked the Helicopter and the security personnel of Helicopter near Kishtaram. No casualties were inflicted. Two batches of Koya commandoes arrived from Andhra border at around 1330 hrs at Kishtram and this information reached PLGA Commanders immediately. As Koya commandoes, whenever they reached the area they created terror and panic in the area PLGA Commanders decided to attack them. They decided to attack the Koya commandoes while they were creating terror in the villages and anticipated that Koya commandoes may raid on the villages Palod or Bhutal.

Accordingly PLGA guerillas planned to place themselves at the river bed close to Kishtaram and depending on the movement of Koya commandoes action plan implemented.

EXECUTION: As planned PLGA troops reached the river bed close to Kishtaram by 0700 hrs and took positions. But the information about the movement of Koya Commandoes reached only after an hour and actual position was not traceable. As per the information available Koya commandoes while leaving Kishtaram said that they were on the way to meet Company-3. As we anticipated Koya commandoes first raided the village Palod and harassed the people. They looted all gold, silver ornaments extracted money and many other house hold items from the villagers. They also beat women in the village. By the time information reached to our PLGA troops the Koya Commandoes already left the village and moved towards village Bhutal. Our troops verifying the movements of the enemy moved tactically towards Village Bhutal. Meanwhile, militia Comrades conveyed that the Koya Commandoes were approaching towards the PLGA troops and had came very close to them.

Immediately after receiving the information our PLGA troops restructured the movement pattern and decided to move ahead in Battalion formation. The movement of the Koya

commandoes was also seen from a distance. Our troops were stationed in good cover and decided to attack the enemy in a tactical manner. There was a big hillock on one side and a reservoir on the other side of the path between our troops and the enemy troops. We expected that the enemy troops may move ahead by negotiating both the hillock and reservoir from the flanks but the enemy troops moved ahead in flanks of the reservoir only leaving the hillock aside.

With the unexpected move, PLGA commanders sent two sections from a PLGA company towards the right side of the reservoir and they immediately opened the fire on the enemy troops. By that time even the enemy troops were not in killing zone and the enemy quickly appreciating the danger stopped the movement and took positions. Orders were issued to the coy on right side to attack from that side and by inflicting casualties the enemy may flee towards the left side of the reservoir and coy on the left side was ordered to engage the enemy and to stop the advance. Both the coys failed to implement the orders. While the coy on right side did not attack the enemy and spent lot of time in confusion, the coy on left did not move ahead and stopped the advancing enemy. Though the coy in the middle is able to restrict the advancing enemy but a platoon from the middle coy went towards right side to eliminate the enemy and in this process the enemy took the advantage of the weak left flank and made an aggressive move ahead. The troops in the left flank lost the confidence and control and PLGA Commanders visualizing the danger ordered to retreat from the situation.

POSITIVE POINTS

1. Our PLGA Commandoes are able to make a surprise attack and inflict casualties on it is a big blow on their moral.
2. Public in the area was as happy as three Koya Commandoes who have done lot of atrocities on them and were killed.

LOSSES TO THE ENEMY: 3 Koya Commandoes were killed

OWN LOSSES: No loss of life or weapons

RECOVERED WEAPONS: SLR LMG-1, SLR-1, AK47-1, and Magazines-12, live ammunition-139 rounds

3.5 Review of Madanawada Deliberate Area Ambush (Operation Vikas)

DATE OF INCIDENT: 12/07/2009

TIME OF INCIDENT: 0945 hrs TO 1330 hrs

LOCATION OF INCIDENT: In the jungles close to vill Corekotte in Manpur block

DISTRICT: Rajnandgaov district, Chattisgarh

STRENGTH OF ENEMY: 40-45(S.T.F, C.A.F and D.F)

WEAPONARY OF ENEMY: AK-47, SLR, INSAS, LMG, 2" MORTAR (Troops armed with B.P. Jackets&helmets)

OWN STRENGTH: App 1 Coy strength

OWN WEAPONARY: AK-47, SLR, INSAS TO 12 BORE WEAPONS AND MINES

BREIF ABOUT THE AREA: To suppress the revolutionary armed struggle by the Maoists, both the Central and State governments are making their best efforts through police and security forces. Many new security camps, new police stations and police out posts were established and presence of the forces increased in the surrounding areas in Rajnandangaov District. Innocent people are being harassed, women being raped, false cases are registered and many other activities to harass and move the public away from the Maoist war are the main objectives of the police forces in the area.

On the other side public are fighting against the system and against the police atrocities and demanding for equality through revolutionary struggle. To express the solidarity of the PLGA with local people and to eliminate the security personnel with the intention to snatch the weapons strengthen their cadres and to exhibit their dominance in the area PLGA Comrades decided to attack the enemy troops in big way in the area. The people of manpur division gave a lot support in

the attacks against the security forces.

AIM: To attack the enemy troops in a big way with the objective to eliminate and recover their weapons and show our presence in the area.

THEY PLAN: Though the enemy established many camps in the area but do not have any understanding on the geographical conditions of that area and there is no proper coordination among them. With these fundamental weaknesses PLGA Commanders decided to attack the enemy in a big way to inflict maximum casualties. Accordingly two groups were established to execute the plan i.e. 3 member Core group and 8 member Order group. As a memory and respect to late leaders Comrade Sudhakarareddy (VIKAS) of C.P.M and late D.K. Vikas of SZCM the name of the operation was given as "Operation Vikas". After observing and studying the movements of enemy troops both the groups planned for an Area Ambush. It was decided to attack the enemy troops whether they came on routine patrolling or on Road opening or if enemy escapes it was decided to attack them by different means.

The enemy was slipping away both in patrolling and while on Road opening and finally PLGA Core group decided to apply different tactics by laying multiple ambushes in the area and main ambush site was selected in the jungles close to village Corekotte and second ambush site was selected on Madanweda-Seethagaov road near village korecatta. With the objective to launch major Area Ambush One major ambush party and two small parties were formed.

EXECUTION

1. Attack On Police Near Madanwada Camp

As per the pre decided plan, team of PLGA guerillas attacked the police personnel early in the morning when they came out of the camp for nature call. Though more than 5 persons come as a group on that day only 2 persons came for nature call and guerillas jumped and fired on them from very close range as

they were hiding in the bushes .While one person was killed on the spot the second person was chased till the entry gate of the camp and he was killed before the sentry at the entry gate. The sentry in the bunker at the front gate was startled and took shelter inside the bunker He did not even fire a single round. With this daring attack on the enemy troops and killing two personnel our PLGA guerillas retreated from the scene very in the tactfully

After the news broke out early morning daring attack on the Madawada camp enemy troops in big number mobilized at different places and as anticipated moved towards Madanwada camp from Rajanadgaov and other places. Our ambush parties placed themselves at the pre-decided ambush points in the jungles of village Corekotte and villageKorecotta.

2. Corekotta Ambush

As expected enemy troops from different places started moving towards Madanwada camp. S.P of the district Rajanandgaov and I.G. of the range also reached Manpur on way to Madanwada. Both discussed their plans on the attack and moved towards Madanwada in their own methods.

First Ambush

Around 0945 hrs the scout placed towards Manpur conveyed the message about the movement of S.P. and I.G. to the main HQrs of Ambush site on the Corekotta village. Immediately the HQrs alerted all the teams placed for ambush about the movement and also conveyed that they are moving in two vehicles. Both the vehicles moved at a little distance in a camouflaged way and by the time the teams realized one vehicle Level already crossed the area and moved ahead. (MAP-1).The second vehicle is an also crossing the area when it was identified and the last section placed there opened fire on the vehicle. But the vehicle without any retaliation moved ahead and moved towards Sitagaov camp. The assault team placed on the way conveyed that the vehicle stopped on the way for a while. Anticipating the enemy in these vehicles, some teams

were advanced by the PLGA commander but it went in vain as the vehicle left the location and moved away.

While the Core group and Order group were under serious discussion on the just passed vehicles and on their identity of police or civil vehicles, the scouts placed on the Manpur side informed that a team is moving on 15 motor cycles followed by a Jeep. (Latter it came to know that I.G. Mahesh Gupta was heading the team). The scouts also informed that a mine proof vehicle will also follow the troops after a gap of 5 minutes.

Prior to this the stop parties placed on the Manpur side blocked the road by putting obstacles, by chopping a tree. After hearing the firing shots when the second vehicle was fired upon. They are not aware about the escape of the vehicle and no ambush was underway. As the Commanders ordered to move away the stop parties moved away from the road side. At that time a bus full of passengers stopped before the obstacle and motor cycle riders were behind the bus. The police personnel asked the passengers to remove the wooden logs of the tree and after removal from the road all the vehicles moved ahead. The police teams used the passengers as human shield in clearing the road and our teams were unable to attack them as many passengers may kill on the attack. The Commander at the HQr conveyed and alerted the teams about the movement of the motor cycles followed by other vehicles. The police teams changed their formation as the Jeep of I.G. was moving behind 3 motor cycles initially.

After 10 motor cycles entered into the ambush site the firing was started by the assault teams. Not anticipating the situation the police personnel on the bikes were fired upon heavily by the section placed there. Few police personnel fell down from the motorcycles while others jumped and tried to take cover. They started retaliation from the available cover. The other 5 motor cycles away from the killing zone jumped away and took cover and tried to reach the flanks of ambush parties. The Mine-proof Vehicle came into the zone while the police inside started firing heavily. Though the teams in the ambush acted as per the plan but the Mine-proof vehicle has

created obstacles as the enemy troops started heavy firing from inside the vehicle. Then our guerillas fired on the tyres of the vehicle and punctured them such the vehicle stopped 30 mtrs before the mined place. 40 Kg mine was placed to explode the vehicle but the vehicle escaped the explosion. The Jeep in which the I.G. was travelling stopped far behind anticipating the danger.

The punctured MVP vehicle created lot of obstacles for our troops from advancing as the police inside were firing indiscriminately. Mean while the police trapped in the ambush were finally engaged and mowed down by the assault platoon-2 the weapons were recovered from them. Almost an hour passed by that time in the whole operation. S.P. Vivek dubey was also in the first two vehicles that escaped the first ambush but his driver was injured in the firing. Sensing the danger S.P. immediately returned after first aid to his driver towards Manpur to stop the convoy of the I.G. Though he tried to convey them on phone, and through wireless set contact was not established and he decided to return to stop the convoy of IG. While returning from Sitagaov, though the stop party-2 tried to stop these vehicles they were not stopped and the message was sent to HQrs but it was not received by the commanders at HQr. The scouts before the stop party unnoticed the movement of these two vehicles, Mean while these two vehicles of S.P crossed the killing zone despite firing was going on and reached the I.G and sent him back to Manpur.

By this time assault pln-2 completed its assigned task of killing and snatching the weapons from the police personnel in the main ambush site. As per the orders of the Commander pln-2 thay moved towards MVP and pln-1 troops moved towards the enemy troops behind MVP. As the pln-2 advanced towards MVP the enemy troops heavily fired and there was a huge exchange of fire between both the parties. Orders were issued by Commanders to use petrol bombs on the MVP. The petrol bomb thrown on the vehicle flames were engulfed and police personnel were in severe shock. They immediately

turned the vehicle and moved towards Manpur. In the mean time both assault platoons pln-2 and pln-1 moved towards Manpur by clearing the area by eliminating the injured enemy troops and snatching their weapons. But the MVP after moving a little ahead turned and returned towards our troops while the police under command S.P positioned around. Anticipating a threat for enemy troops HQrs conveyed to retreat from the scene and both assault platoons started retreating from there.

Third Ambush

While the PLGA Commander was discussing about the removal of mines that were placed on the main ambush site, movement of enemy troops were seen from the Manpur side. S.P Vivek Dubey's voice was heard shouting on his troops to move ahead. "**manpur wale aajav, advance hojav**". While S.P. and his troops were moving on foot towards the ambush site MPV was moving behind them. Mean time orders were received from HQr that all the teams should take their positions and alerted about the movement of enemy troops. It was also ordered that if the MPV reaches the site it should be exploded as ordered. Accordingly all the teams took positions and as are waiting for the enemy troops.

Enemy troops were advancing towards ambush site and removing the dead bodies of the police personnel MPV. While some enemy troops were clearing and lifting the bodies into the others were moving tactically to attack the enemy. The enemy troops reached 30-40 yards short of the mine site and after collecting all the dead bodies returned on way back. They were lucky as they have not reached the mine zone but they were very much inside the killing zone. They had not seen the bodies that were laying down on the other side of the mine zone. Our assault teams were patiently waiting for the MPV to reach mine zone but the sudden returning of the vehicle towards manpur side made our commanders to quickly jump on a decision. It was ordered to explode the mine and in that surprise and dangerous situation to assault the enemy troops present in the killing zone. Accordingly mine was exploded

and our assault teams made dashing attack on the enemy troops and killed them and made advance towards the MPV.

Mean while a police party took cover in some ditches nearby and started firing on our teams but our dynamic PLGA guerillas threw grenades into the ditches and fired upon them. All the three police men inside were killed in the attack and their weapons were snatched. While our teams planned to advance and make a final assault on the MPV the fire from the vehicle was coming heavily on our teams, in the mean time orders were received from Hqr to retreat from the area to administered zone.

3. Korecatta Ambush

One more ambush was planned on the road connecting Madanwada and Sitagaov on the day prior to early morning ambush on the Madanwada police camp. Anticipating movement of many enemy troops towards Madanwada camp after the early morning attack our team planned to place a mine on the road.while Planting of the mine at night, movement of enemy troops were sensed and thay left the place hurriedly without planting the mino. The next day after the main ambush was started at Corekatta other team reached the place and planted the mine. Mean while scouts alerted that police team was approaching the area on foot. Immediately our team left the place and hide themselves close to the area. The police team headed by S.I of police station **AVUNDHI** approached the area and sensing suspicion started searching the area where mine was placed. As it was a great opportunity our team exploded the mine and opened fire. Two police men including the S.I were killed and three others were injured in the attack. After inflicting the maximum casualties teams retreated safely from the area. The whole operation ended in a great success 30 police men were killed in the operation including the S.P and 2 S.Is of the district and 12 police men were injured while one Comrade got injured in the successful operation. We are able to lay three ambushes in the same site in a short time on the same day while the enemy escaped in the first ambush second

and third ambushes took the lives of 25 policemen including the officers. By puncturing the tyres, the Mine Proof Vehicle were able to make it retreat from the killing zone and throwing of petrol bombs on it and attacking the enemy troops was a new experience in the ambush.

RECOVERIES FROM THE ENEMY: AK47-7, SLR-3, INSAS-14 AND 2" MORTAR-1, LIVE AMMUNITION-923 MORTAL SHELLS-3, MOBILE PHONES-11, GREANADES-15, B.P JACKET PLATES-35, B.P HELMETS-14 WIRELESS SETS-3 AND CASH Rs 8,732

Points Noticed in The Operation;

1. Planning of area ambush though a new concept it is a major success and in future we can plan more of these attacks.
2. Conducting of 3 ½ hours major operation on the enemy troops was a major achievement.
3. Making the MVP ineffective by puncturing tyres and restricting its movement and forcing it to retreat from the ambush site and attacking with petrol bombs was also a major achievement.
4. Conducting an area ambush at par with Guerilla battalion was a great experience for future operations.
5. Public and the militia in the area gave lot of cooperation in making the operation a great success.
6. As few Comrades in some teams did not act as sariftlyas they were ordered, then operation was prolonged and the scouts at Sitagaov side failed to convey the movement of two vehicles back to Manpur side.
7. Petrol bombs should be identified as weapons and should be carried safely and when the opportunity comes they should be used.




Figure 3.5

3.6 LESSONS LEARNT FROM LWE CASE STUDIES

1. **Lack of basic infrastructure** (latrine/toilet in this case) within the Camp's perimeter fencing was the primary cause of the casualty in Madanwada incident (Rajnandagaon, Chattisgarh) since they would not have ventured out a distance of (100-150) yards for nature's call if there was one inside.
2. Regular patterns of movement if unavoidable should be carried out only after area **domination/sanitization**.
3. Ambushes by naxalites generally laid on both ways as was the case with earlier ambushes. Security forces should **lay their own ambushes** instead of **being ambushed**.
4. **Tactful movement** should be there to avoid casualty. It might try and **time-consuming** but there is no other viable option but to move tactically under these conditions.
5. Whenever a Police post/CRPF Camp is established, particularly in operational area, **camp contingency** is a must.

6. There is no compulsion to negotiate the '**kacha**' or '**pucca and mined**' roads by vehicles during emergency. Helicopters can perform the same task better. So **negotiating the area** should be taken into consideration.
7. **Lack of proper Counter-ambush tactics** compounded the casualty of SFs so there is an urgent need for developing counter-ambush drills in such areas during Training.
8. Ambush within 200m radius of Camp area speaks a lot about the preparedness (unpreparedness) level of the SFs.
9. **Absence of Counter-surveillance mechanism** is another drawback. Men in the camp sit in the built-up areas not aware of what is happening in the camp surroundings.
10. Naxals have a very good communication network by way of '**Paan walas**' and shops in the vicinity of the camp. So there is a need to sensitize the troops about the **fatal effects of casually disclosing information** to the people outside the camp.
11. **Safest place on being ambushed:** It is said that on being ambushed, safest place is the location of ambush party and immediate assault onto them can reduce the loss of lives.
12. Offensive spirit: When caught in an ambush, offence is the best defence. Going to the ground will be counter productive as the killing zone will be covered by fire/IEDs.
13. **Planning, briefing, co-ordination and constant monitoring** are essential parts of execution of operations and their importance should never be undermined.
14. **Preparations and rehearsals for contingencies** will help in reacting in a coordinated and effective manner.
15. **Fire Control:** In the naxal infested areas, troops may have to fight prolonged battles before any reinforcements reach the site. At times, they may even be required to face repeated attacks. Hence **strict fire control** and carrying **extra ammunition** is essential. Further change of INSAS with SLR may be considered as 7.62x51 mm round of SLR has more stopping power than 5.56 mm round of INSAS.

The SLR also being a single shot weapon has better fire control than INSAS which has capability to fire short burst.

16. **Domination of heights and clearing of Bounds:** In repeated attacks, the Naxalites have been causing damages to the troops from dominating position. Hence there is a need to select all heights and other places of tactical importance bounds at the planning stage itself and follow proper bound clearing drills.
17. **Keeping the Headquarter truthfully informed:** There is a need to keep the Headquarters informed of the facts and actual situation instead of feeding misleading information.
18. **Immediate use of mortar and rifle grenades** where ever possible can be of great help in breaking ambushes. In case high trajectory fire is not possible, the above weapons may be used for **direct fire** at low angle.
19. **Delays in arrival of reinforcements** have resulted in avoidable loss of life in the past also. Further, the ammunition being carried by the troops cannot last indefinitely. Hence while planning for special ops, there is need to plan for despatch of reinforcement at the earliest – even by **helicopters** which are not usually the case.
20. **Blocking Escape routes of Naxalites:** The Naxalites after attacking security forces have been repeatedly escaping with the arms/ammunition. Though reinforcements are sent, there is no co-ordinated plan to block the escape routes of the naxalites. It is suggested that as part of contingency, an **integrated action plan** to block escape routes should be part of every operation. However, this would be possible only if the present system of deployment is changed and **adequate troops are deployed in grid pattern**.
21. Employing the “**mad minute**” drills as popularized by DG CRPF, Shri K. Vijay Kumar, IPS during Ambush resulted in the success of **Kishenji neutralization** and so

important to impart such drill, during basic training.

3.7 Lessons Learnt From Operations in Kashmir Valley (Internal Security)

1. Synergy between Officers and Troops of various forces involved in the operation. Absence of 'one-upmanship' attitude between the commanders of the three Forces.
2. Fine-tuned Ops plan – coordinating the entire operation was possible only because of the excellent rapport between the commanders.
3. **Scrupulous pursuit of INT** – regular and continuous collection of INT from sources and apprehended militants are primary requisite for the success of any operation.
4. **High-intensify Fire power** – use of MGL (Multiple Grenade Launcher) was always found to be very effective in any prolonged operations. CRPF QAT should also be provided with the same.
5. **One minute drills** as propagated by DG, CRPF, Shri Vijay Kumar, IPS, was regularly practiced which gave the troops ease of handling weapons at the **moment of need**.
6. **HUMINT**-laborious, time-consuming, perilous. But when it came, it was reliable, precise & real-time.
7. **Terrain & Human mapping** – Familiarization of the area by regular Area Domination Patrol (ADP) enabled the Officers and Troops to have knowledge of Terrain the back of their palms. **Identifying** who is an innocent civilian & who is an insurgent is a vital element in Operational areas. Many **outreach programmes** (CAP/WHAM) initiated by **Dr. B.N.Ramesh**, IPS, IG (Ops) KMR helped in bridging the gap between the CRPF and the locals as our operations were always non-invasive and non-intrusive.
8. **Constant briefing & de-briefing** of troops is very important as it helped thrash out the smallest mistakes they would commit & share the smallest lessons they learned. It also helped them not only to have a closer understanding among themselves, but also hone their

operational skills. So the importance of briefing & debriefing of troops can never be over emphasized for any important operation.

9. Effective functioning of the state police SOG was very instrumental in bringing about the success of such operations.
10. Integration of security & development/employment initiated by Dr.B.N.Ramesh, IPS, IG (Ops) KMR helped in bridging the gap between the CRPF and the locals as CRPF was now considered a Job Provider for the Needy Kashmiri Youth.
11. **Small team concept** – a small team of well-trained and motivated troops led by a capable officer produce remarkable results.
12. **Presence of Senior Officers** invariably boost the morale and motivation of the troops as was evident from the timely presence of IG (Ops) Kashmir in all the major operations.
13. **No HR violations** can occur due to the presence of Senior high ranking Officers during the encounter and their direct supervision of the entire Ops.
14. BP Jackets during the operation is mandatory as it could change the outcome of a 'bullet hit'.
15. **Anticipating the designs of the militants** as well as the sympathizers among the villagers who are bent on downgrading the morale of the security forces and thereby diverting their attention and taking steps to prevent the regrouping of such people for disturbances.
16. **Maintaining absolute calm and coolness** so that the special operations group will work with surgical precision.
17. Even if the **response of the terrorist is one round fire for 10 or 15 minutes** we need to keep him engaged by confusing him so that encounter is continually taking place till it is totally completed. This idea needs to be propagated especially in populated areas so that no on lookers or no pressmen will be allowed to venture or

come near the spot of encounter.

18. **Senior officers need to take the control** by not leaving the matter of **decisions** on the juniors shoulders as there is every possibility of the juniors developing a cold feet and just remaining there as mute spectators and allowing the situation to deteriorate. **A senior officer coming to the spot** late, can at the most do a postmortem and postmortem can be done by anybody.
19. **Last but not least is not to forget the lessons that we learnt from the previous operations** as there is every possibility of repetition of the same as the famous saying goes "Those who forget the history are condemned to repeat it."

4

Main Findings of The Study

The surveys with huge number of responses, focused group discussions, interactions with trainees, Officers running the training institutions, Chiefs of Police like DGP of Chhattisgarh, Special DG of CRPF, IGP of Bastar, Intelligence, Police headquarters, Training, Special Task Force, DIsG of BSF/ITBP in Chhattisgarh, Commanding Officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, SP of Districts of Dantewada, Bijapur, Jagdalpur, Ambikapur, Raipur, Mahasamund, Divisional Commissioner of Bastar, District Collectors of Bijapur, Dantewada, Malkangiri of Odisha, Commandants of Special Task Force called COBRA of CRPF, Police Officials of Andhra Pradesh Police, SIB, Greyhounds and Officers of Correctional Homes (Jails) of Vishakhapatnam, Chenchalguda, Hyderabad – all were done with a view to know what ails our training and how to correct the same. The scope of the research was very vast and hence one has to confine oneself to the above interactions in order to come out with practically implementable suggestions so that future pass-outs from these institutions would be better prepared, equipped, skilled and confident to face the challenges of Internal Security.

4.1 K.S.A. Analysis of Subordinate Ranks

4.1.1 Knowledge

The Knowledge, skills and attitude analysis was done after interacting with subordinate rank officers, at the level of Platoon Commanders and the following were the highlights.

The Platoon Commander's training should invariably include the knowledge about

- (a) Terrain, which helps him to appreciate the differentials, peculiar characteristics.
- (b) Topography, which helps him to appreciate the availability of water points, shelter places, high grounds, gorges, avoidable routes, possible ambush points, counter ambush points etc.
- (c) Demography which helps him to know about local people, culture, language, graphs, class-relations, important persons, shops, shelter points, sympathizers, victims of Naxal violence etc. so that he started collecting intelligence, used the differences for the success of his mission.
- (d) Ideology, which helps him to appreciate the ideological positioning of his adversaries namely the Maoists, in order to beat them in their own game. Further more, ideological difference among different warring factions among LWE practitioner can also be put to use. For example, in the Andhra-Chhattisgarh border, there were formidable differences between Jana Shakthi Group and Maoist of CPI (Maoist) or the erstwhile People's War Group.

4.1.2 Skills

For the platoon level officers to effectively lead their platoon, skills need to be constantly upgraded so that they would be on par with Maoist ranks and the more skills they acquired, the more were their chances of victory.

Skills needs to be upgraded in the following four areas.

- (a) **Strategy:** A correct strategy increases the chances of success and decreases the chances of failure. Strategic skill improves the chances of survival and capacity to impinge maximum damage on the flanks of adversary. Strategic skills must be constantly upgraded and for this competitive analysis (Courtesy

Michael Porter) should be conducted regularly.

- (b) **Tactics:** By adopting correct tactics in movement, halting, fighting, rescuing, retreating, advancing, one lessened the losses and caused extensive damage to the enemy flanks. There are no thumb rules here but tactics could be taught so as to expose to the mind the avenues of possibilities.
- (c) **Firing:** Wasting ammunition by panic-firing would surely end in disastrous casualties for any fighting force. Correctness of shooting, clever utilization of field crafts and area weapons and appreciation of the fact that ammunition is the lifeline in a crisis situation is to be ingrained in every trainee as without that the mighty AK-47 is nothing but a piece of iron and wood. The "Rifle Song" popularized by CRPF among new recruits is a case in point here.
- (d) **Fitness:** The fundamental confidence building measure was fitness and comfort efforts and so it must be part of any training requirements.

4.1.3 Attitude

Unless the attitudinal change through appropriate training methodology were brought in, unwilling horses or unsuitable commanders would not win the race. Wars were fought in the minds of men and hence suitable attitudinal changes were must. This comprises of four parts.

- (a) **Adaptability:** The sooner the team adopts to new environment, the better it is. This must be rehearsed, calibrated. There was a need to bring Psychiatrists/ Psychologists for training the teams.
- (b) **Open-Mindedness:** Attitudinal change through training was essential so as to leave "*I Know everything*" attitude and be open to suggestions especially in field.
- (c) **Sustainability:** The enthusiasm should not be perturbed by either initial successes or failures and in

the war, patience is the name of the game. Training too should be sustainable on a long-term basis.

- (d) **Sympathy for victims:** In order to win over the minds and hearts of people, (WHAM – strategy) it is important to have sympathy for victims. Training through appropriate psychometric methods should be adopted so that the suspicion of people be replaced with sympathy for victim, obviously laced with sufficient caution.

The following **table no.4.1** summarizes the above findings.

Subordinate Ranks

KNOWLEDGE	Topography Demography Ideology
SKILL	Tactics Firing Fitness
ATTITUDE	Open mindedness Sustainability Sympathy for Victims

Future Research: In K-S-A aspects for Middle and Top level Functionaries

4.2 Focus Group Discussions – Findings

THE FEED BACK OBTAINED FROM THEM IS FILLED UP IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT AFTER INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH FOCUS GROUPS.

TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT FORMAT –1

FOCUS GROUP: - TRAINERS /IN-SERVICE OF RTC –II
AVADI EXPERIENCE

Table 4.2

Tasks to be/being performed Area	Knowledge- Requirement	Skill-Requirement	Attitude- Requirement	Training Required	Focal Areas of Training
Knowledge	i) Local Language ii) Knowledge of Banking	i) Communication Skill ii) Full confidence of weapon iii) Using the land resource for cover	Adventure, Non-fear	Yes	To impart the capability of Unit using really available knowledge
Demography knowledge	Identifying the weakness of supporters of Naxals	the Camouflaging skill of	Invite them for taking help from CRPF – civil action	Teaching of local culture and empathizing with the local people through psychic operations	Increased interaction with teachers, students.
Filling up vacancy of non-governance with governance	Knowledge about government departments	i) Networking skill ii) Team building skill	To be sympathetic to people	To know about various government schemes, resource, persons.	Empathetically for recruitment. For eg. Mothugudem Camp
Intelligence gathering	Internet using knowledge	i) watching media, NGO etc., ii) Customizing exciting knowledge iii) Data mining	i) Aptitude for mixing in the crowd, aptitude for achieving excellent results while maintaining low key	Information gathering, compilation, interpretation, formation of workable intelligence, collection and timely dispersal of actionable intelligence.	Attachment with interrogation parties, probation with excellent intelligence officers for field experience.

In conducting the present research the training institutes at Raipur (HQ of Chhattisgarh State) and the training institutes both of the CRPF as well as that of the State Police were visited. Discussions and Interviews were conducted with the then DGP, Chhattisgarh State Police, ADG in terms of Naxalite force Chhattisgarh Police, ADG(Int), IG(Int), IG(Ops), DIG(Ops),

S'sP, DIG and IG of severely affected districts like Bastar, Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon were done by the researcher.

Questionnaires as mentioned in the annex, were circulated and they were filled up in the training institutions so as to come to conclusion towards fulfilling the research objectives

Since structured department like Police Training Institutions and Police Department were the respondents here, the organizational culture of police department as well as CPMFs were taken into consideration while conducting the research.

However, a sample of 150 surrendered and arrested Naxalites were conducted in the bordering area of Chhattisgarh and Odisha, in the Jails of Andhra Pradesh and their analysis were done.

4.3 Findings From Focused Group Discussions with Field Commanders

- 1) Field commanders desired the training to be imparted to increase the confidence levels of trainees.
- 2) The field Commanders also demanded that the youthful nature or young age of the Constable was to be taken advantage of. In other words, the inexperienced shall be covered up with better exposure to field visits of actual encounter spots, to the extent possible or at least simulated ones.
- 3) The field Commanders desired that there shall be synergy between training imparted at training institute and training in the in service arena.
- 4) The bordering area field Commanders of Bihar-Jharkhand, Jharkhand-Bengal, Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh-Odisha, Jharkhand-Odisha, Bengal-Odisha, Andhra Pradesh-Odisha, Chhattisgarh-Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh-Maharashtra - demanded the troops to be imparted the skills of local tribal language like Gonda, Koya etc.

- 5) Since the Maoist operated in trans-border areas, there must be training imparted to SFs at these border areas, much similar to the lines the Maoists adopted in training their Cadres.
- 6) The field Commanders also wished to bring other important department like, Forests, Tribal's Welfare, Agriculture-Forest Cooperatives, PWD, Roads etc. for certain specialized training.
- 7) Everyone demanded exposure to Intelligence gathering among the troops.

4.4 Discussion on The Findings

- 1) Perceptions about Maoism were strongly linked with perception about quality of training imparted.
- 2) Field firing experienced on the part of the trainees increased their confidence to fight the Naxalites.
- 3) Awareness of training skills increased the confidence of the trainees to fight the Naxals as knowledge frees them from the fears which they had as untrained civilians.
- 4) Firing with AK-47 rifle also did the same with the confidence level of the trainees.
- 5) Age has got some relation with particular perception about Maoism. The younger a trainee perceived Maoism as organized criminal activity.
- 6) Education opened up the power of critical analysis and prevented people from rural back ground to view Maoism as a romantic idea of political change or economically emancipative ideology.
- 7) Welfare provisioning like liberal leave grant too influenced the perception very positively. The more the system adhered to its announced rules, the perception was towards viewing Maoism as one of organized criminal activity.
- 8) The more a trainee was satisfied with training, the more his perception of viewing Maoism as one of organized criminal group activity.

- 9) Exposure to IED also very positively increased the confidence levels of fighting the Naxalites.

Intelligence training to the police personnel from the best available agencies in the country like the BSF intelligence School and SIB of Andhra Police. For example- CRPF had established such a school with effort from its DG, Sh. K.Vijay Kumar, IPS. Similar such effort should be made by bordering districts in the ACB area and COB, AOB area.

One minute drill which was introduced by Shri K.Vijay Kumar, IPS, Director General CRPF need to be practiced by the special operations group personnel of both the states, specially the commando teams.

The points mentioned in this chapter were implementable forthwith. All such points were being implemented in a customized manner in Kashmir Valley, the result being zero casualty and tremendous success in Counter Insurgency Operations and Law and Order maintenance in the entire Valley.

The researcher had not gone into the administrative, the individual level recommendations like rewards, punishments etc. or the developmental administration which was there to solve the basic problem of Naxalites. In confining the research arena to only the training needs assessment, the above points were not analyzed. There is thus a scope of future research in these areas.

4.5 Recommendations of The Study

Following are the recommendations regarding training of police personnel:

- 1) Field Firing practical experience was of utmost importance to any Constable, who when deployed in jungles and hostile terrain, would have some confidence of weapons being fired at him. Maoist were world-class experts in LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) and masterminded the art of IED manufacturing in customized environment. The

Constables should have practical experience of the same. The critical exposure, films, simulation games were of no use.

- 2) Exposure at field level of important weapons like AK-47 rifles or INSAS, CGRL etc. were important. The more the exposure to firing the better it was. Repairing, one-hand firing, firing in darkness are to be imparted both at firing ranges and as dry practices for thousands (1000s) of hours.
- 3) Practices of fire control orders so that ammunition is not wasted if one were in ambush, not losing cool, responding to orders etc. is of great importance.
- 4) Rehearsals of ambushes, counter-ambushes, raids are a must and the more frequently they were done, the better was co-ordination in real time.
- 5) Battle inoculation needed to be frequently done so that the fear of bullets and firing would not be there.
- 6) Such exercises must be done for all Constables so that whoever happens to go on duty would be prepared. The practice found unfortunately was for the so-called elite troops. Casualties happen more in the non-elite troops.
- 7) Since, weapon looting was a major aim of Maoists, safeguarding of weapons and destroying the same at the time of ultimate sacrifice of one's life should also be taught to the Constabulary.
- 8) Map reading, working small groups of 8/9 members, jungle survival, stealthy movement etc. should be practiced.
- 9) Best field Commanders who had experienced such realities should be the source persons for imparting such training.
- 10) A Trainer who became one for the sake of his proximity to some senior official or because of extra D.A./T.A. is "UNFIT" to be a trainer.
- 11) Trainer's credibility brought credibility to the training and hence to the "trainee-trainer-training-

- transaction". Most experienced, battle-hardened commanders should occasionally teach these subjects.
- 12) Physical fitness, less weight, best capability in running, running under stress should be practiced constantly. The Andhra Pradesh Greyhounds training and the Rashtriya Rifles training in Kashmir were best examples to be emulated throughout the Country.
 - 13) Basic knowledge of medicine, skills of first aid to stop bleeding, rescuing from bombs/IED explosion sites etc. must be part of the training.
 - 14) Since the ambushes that happened on the Forces nowadays was from companies of the Maoists, with 300 to 500 persons participating, the preparation for Security Forces should also be done on a similar scale.
 - 15) Maoists practiced stealth and changed their 'L' formation to 'V' formation and quickly gave a feeling of huge numbers in strength whereas their party might not be even 1/4 of what they aim to be seen and sounded the same must be practiced by Security Forces, The name of the game is to "FIGHT A GUERILLA LIKE A GUERILLA IN HIS PLACE".
 - 16) Knowledge about terrain, topography, climate, and ethnography must be taught to all.
 - 17) Since Maoists attacked the Police Stations etc, repulsive strategies should be practiced to gain confidence.
 - 18) State of the art Communication setup must be a part of the training right from beginning.
 - 19) Training expenditure was a great investment for future and must be done adequately and should not be seen as a non-plan expenditure.
 - 20) Feedback of every programme from trainees must be obtained transparently and not "PSYCHOPHANTLY" and a different professional organization must analyze the results. The group of professional on-time Commander were the best to Judge.

4.6 Recommended Research

To have a super specialization among different specialized functional groups, further research can be conducted in following areas.

- (i) A time series study of the effect of relief and rehabilitation by the surrendered Maoists, efforts being made for their surrender to 5 years, 10 years, and 15 years period regarding the impact of the surrendered policy of the Government on their life style.
- (ii) To examine the tendency of recidivism i.e. going back to the Maoist movement again, because of suboptimal implementation of the so called surrender policy of relief and rehabilitation policy.
- (iii) To suggest a bench mark training strategy for specialized groups in: -
 - (a) Operations
 - (b) Intelligence gathering
 - (c) Quick response
- (iv) To critically examine the responses of various state like Odisha, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh with reference to the state response in case of kidnapping of IAS officers, District Collectors, MPs, MLAs and Ministers etc. and to suggest a policy in preventing such events from happening and also in devising a strategy of response in case of the happening of such incidents.

5

Course Syllabi for Various Ranks Deployed in Naxalite Prone Areas

Based on the findings of the study the Investigator has evolved the syllabi for training of Police Personnel in naxalite prone areas:

- Dys S.Ps/ASPs - Civil Police
- ACs of Armed Police/ACs of CAPFs

Or

Inspectors of Armed Police/CAPFs

- Direct S.Is of Civil Police
- Armed S.Is of CAPFs/SAP
- Constables of Civil Police
- Constables of SAP/CAPFs

5.1 Syllabus for Central Armed Police Force ACs/DySPs

The syllabus will cover movement by camouflage and concealment, fighting positions, including dragon fighting positions, one man fighting position etc., their movement during ground flares, direct/indirect fire, fire and move and then observation in which overall Cordon & Search Operations (CASOs), night observations, contradicting colours, range estimation, which include 100 meters unit measure method in day time, appearance of the objects method in the day time, flash and sound methods including things to look for and listen for, first aid, personal hygiene in the war situations, evacuation, basic ballistics, anti personnel mines, claymore mines, how to

minimize the injuries, experience in crossing the mine fields, movements in the mined areas, weapons and fire control.

Besides the above the Course will delve into the intricacies of the following subjects :

- iii. Politics & Social Issues.
- iv. Extremist movements, modus operandi, way to tackle
- v. Intelligence, Interrogation, Integrations.
- vi. Delivering of Services.
- vii Delinquency, Corruption, Moral turpitude & ill effects of the same on victims.
- viii. Case studies - LWE

(A)

- a. Case study of Ambush at Madanwada and Korkotti, P.S. Manpur, Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
- b. Case study of Ambush on CRPF troops near village Talmetla, Chintalnar, P.S. Chintagufa, Distt-Dantewada, Chhattisgarh
- c. Case study of Ambush on CRPF troops near village Maharabera, P.S. Dhaudai, Distt-Narenpur, Chhattisgarh.
- d. Case study of Kishenji encounter.
- e. Review of opportunity Ambush on Koya Commando Police troops
- f. Review of ambush at Vill. Minupa:South Bastar division, Chattisgarh
- g. Review of Mandagiri Opportunity Ambush
- h. Review of Madanawada deliberate area Ambush (Operation Vikas)

(B)

- (a) Case studies of Internal security (Jammu & Kashmir)

<i>S/No</i>	<i>Place of Incident</i>	<i>Date</i>	
i.	Village Dadsara, Tral, Awantipore (J&K)	02/03/2011	Jaish-e-Mohammad Area Commander Shabbir Ahmad Qureshi@Shoab was neutralized.
ii.	Village Hanjan Payeen, P.S. Rajpora, Distt-Pulwama (J&K)	08/07/2011 & 09/07/2011	Two dreaded militants of JeM namely Javed Ahmed Nengroo and Ahsan Bhai were neutralized.
iii.	Village Baghat Mohall, Batpora, Sopore (J&K)	13/09/2011	Abdullah Uni LeT Commander of North Kashmir was neutralized.
iv.	Village Adoor, a, Distt - Pulwama (J&K)	04/2/2012	Two LeT terrorist namely Ashiq Gani Shah & Mudsher Ahmed Seikh were killed.

ix. Enactments - Laws like PESO etc.

x. Panel Discussions

- (a) Planning
- (b) Preparation
- (c) Briefing
- (d) Execution
- (e) Communication
- (f) Debriefing
- (g) Documentation

xi. Seamless connectivity with

- (a) Forests
- (b) Rural Development
- (c) Social Welfare
- (d) Tribal Welfare
- (e) Criminal Justice System
- (f) BDO/SDO/Patwari/Sarpanch
- (g) Panchayath Raj

xii. Management of Stake holders

- (a) Political Parties
- (b) Labour/Agriculture works
- (c) Communal/Organization Caste

- (d) NGOs
- (e) Media
- xiii. Field visits - (A)
 - (a) Resource persons - Authorities on the subject:-
 - (i) Regional
 - (ii) Provincial
 - (iii) National Level
 - (b) Jails
 - (c) Surrendered Maoists
 - (d) Ex-Civil servants like Aruna Roy, B.N.Yugandhar, N.C.Saxena etc.
 - (e) Social activists like Rajender Singh.
- xiv. Field Visits - (B)
 - (a) IED Management school - CRPF
 - (b) Grey Hounds - AP
 - (c) CIAT - CRPF
 - (d) CWTS - BSF
 - (e) IDSA
 - (f) I.B. /CBI
- xv. Field Visits - (C)
 - (a) Recent encounter sites
 - (b) Briefing by field Commanders
 - (c) Practical experiences
 - (d) LRP, CASO, Area domination, Night Patrolling, Jungle warfare.
- XVI. Physical
 - 10 KM - Run - 5 days a week
 - PPT - 5 days a week
 - BOAC - 5 days a week
- XVII. Weapons & Grenades
 - Weapons Training (All weapons)
 - Weapons Firing -16 Nos
 - HAT
 - Night firing Practice
 - Grenade/SLR Grenade
- XVIII. Map Reading
 - Theory

- Navigation Day exercise (four)
- Night Navigation exercises
- GPS
- XIX. Field Craft
 - Subjects including practical
 - Importance of field craft
 - Ground appreciation, cover
 - Individual stalking
 - Camouflage & concealment
 - Judging distance
 - observation
- XX. Tactics
 - Tactics including practical
 - Case Study
 - Tactical movement, Halting drill
 - Ambush, Raid all types
 - Post protection
 - Cordon & search
 - Patrolling
 - Combing interception
 - Snipping.
- XXI. Allied Subjects
 - Security know the land, people and extremists, explosives Intelligence etc.,
- XXII. Camp exercise 3 days/night
- XXIII. Instructional Practice
- XXIV. Miscellaneous Opening and Closing Address - Tests - etc.

5.2 The Following Should be The Detailed Syllabus For

Inspectors of Armed Police/CAPFs,
Direct S.Is of Civil Police,
Armed S.Is of CAPFs/SAP,
Constables of Civil Police,
Constables of SAP/CAPFs.

OUTDOOR SUBJECTS: -

Subject: Map Reading

- I. Map reading ki aam jankari
- II. Conventional signs, Technical terms aor Topographical forms
- III. Disha aur degrees, uttar ki prakar aur uttar disha ka pata lagana
- IV. Service prismatic compass
- V. Service protractor
- VI. Scale, bearing and back bearing
- VII. Map ko set karne aur own position ka pata lagana
- VIII. Map to ground aur ground to map
- IX. Din ke samay aur raat ke samay march karne
- X. GPS se parichay, vishesh wa prakar, battery prambh karne ki prakriya,
- XI. switch wa control aur GPS ko on-off karne tahta system setup karne ka tarika GPS ke mark sakam par we point banana, map ke vishesh point ki askar aur deshantar ke data ko edit/delete karne aur GPS set ke prayog se naye sthan par pahuchakar wapis lautana.

Subject : Field Engineering, Explosives & IEDS

- I. Sabhi prakar ke tenton ke bare mein jaankari
- II. Field engineering ki bare mein jaankari
- III. Road block lagana
- IV. Taar ki rukawaton ke bare mein jaankari
- V. Fire trench aur weapon pit ko taiyar karne ki jaankari aur abhiyas
- VI. Mine Fields
- VII. Trip Flare ko lagana aur
- VIII. Demolition set aur blind ko barbad karne
- IX. Basic demolition set aur assault charges
- X. Mine anti pers m-18 directional fragmentation (clay more mines)
- XI. Sniffer dogs ki bare mein jaankari

Field Craft

- I. Targeton ka bayan aur pehchan
- II. Cheejeen kyo nazar aati hei
- III. Shru ki dekh bhal
- IV. False ka anuman lagana
- V. Camouflage and concealment
- VI. Khali hath aur hathiyar ke sath harkat karma (stalking)
- VII. Fire position chunana
- VIII. Range card banana
- IX. Rat ka kaam aur dekhbhal
- X. F.C.O. (fire control order)
- XI. Night sentaries ki duties

Subject : Battle Craft

- I. Section and Platton battle drills
- II. Battle procedure
- III. Foji tactical shabdon ka matlab (Tactical terms)
- IV. Field Signals
- V. Section/Platoon formation
- VI. Platoon ke hathiyaron ka siting aur employment
- VII. Surveillance and observation

Subject : Tactics

- I. Patrolling
- II. Ambush and Counter Ambush
- III. Ops of War Advance
- IV. Ops of War Defence
- V. Ops of War Attack
- VI. Harboursing
- VII. Raid (Larai main aur ci ops main)
- VIII. Fighting in built up area
- IX. Jungle se parichaye
- X. Registhan se parichaye
- XI. Heliborne assault ops
- XII. Ops based on a river
- XIII. Escape and evasion

- XIV. Turant hamle ke liye
- XV. Objective raste aur fire support ka vishleshan
- XVI. Avalanche ki baremain jankari
- XVII. Mountain warfare
- XVIII. Nuclear warfare
- XIX. Information warfare
- XX. Yudh kshetra ke manovagainik pahlu (Dynamics in battle field)

Counter Insurgency & Police Operations

- I. Insurgency in general
- II. Aid to civil authority
- III. CI ops main paramilitary, CPOs aur State Police ke saath kaam karna
- IV. Armed forces Spl power act
- V. Built up area ki clear karna
- VI. Built up area ko clear karna
- VII. Combat tracking (pichha karna)
- VIII. Raid on a hide out
- IX. Crowd dispersal
- X. Mobile check post (MCP)
- XI. Quick action team (QAT)
- XII. Road opening cvy protection
- XIII. Morale
- XIV. Counter terrorism ilaqe mein media ki ahmiyat aur media ke saath me-milap
- XV. Man management aur welfare
- XV. Morality and ethich (sadvtavhar aur aacharneeti)
- XVI. Team work aur team bldg
- XVII. Unit kote and magazine security drill

Subject : Jungle Camp & Field Firing Endurance

- I. Natural/improvised battle obstacles Assault course
- II. Endurance (raining) 10 km route march linked ith tac/navigational move
- III. Endurance training 15 kms in FSMO

Subject : Map Reading & GPs

- I. Setting of map, finding own position and six figure grid reference
- II. Use of compass and making night march
- III. Map to ground and ground to map (exercise)
- IV. Use of GPS and movement with GPS, finding own position way creating route and back track
- V. Point to point march with the help of GPS 3 to 4 points may be selected over a distance of 12-15 kms
- VI. Briefing on sketch/Xerox copy of map

Tactical OPS

- I. History of naxalism and organization CPI (Maoist)
- II. Modus operandi of naxals
- III. Jungle characteristics and its effect on Ops
- IV. Harboring/LUP (Troops will be made to under take cross country move up to 15-20 kms in scale B and then take up LUP/harbour with proper LUP/harbour with proper LUP/harbour drill with all round defence. Potential concealment, field of fire etc. in mind) Wire obstacles & trip flares will be used in Harbour locations.
- V. Establishment of Coy/Pl post in insurgency area, camp security measures and communication in the post. (Concept of offensive defence will be adopted 1/3, - 1/2 strength for observation outside the camp round the clock) camp security to be strengthened by laying obstacles i.e. Wire obstacles, intruder alarm (noisy bell), Trip flares, Tree machans for better observation and better field of fire.
- VI. Preparation of contingency plan for coy/pl post in case of naxal attack. (Contingency plan should cater for multidirectional attack, judicious sitting of weapons and location of QRT concept of offensive defence 1/3 to 1/2 strength to be utilized for observation round the clock)

- VII. Patrolling/Tactical movement (concept of complementary patrolling from basic to the medium and higher level will be practiced during the exercises jungle camp may be located at more than one location by dividing parties under one DC and one AC and troops will be exposed and trained in complementary C level, B level and A level patrolling as per DG CRPF directions vide instruction No. OPDA3-OPS-DG/CRPF dated 05/05/2011)
- VIII. Approach to target and target get recee. (Stealth, surprise and tactical movement and tactical movement will be kept in mind. Target will be approached through crawling while close to it to maintain surprise).
- IX. Combat survival skill and jungle diseases (Troops may be trained to survive on one meal a day).
- X. Ambush (Troops to be trained in clover formation drill for breaking Ambush. This will be practiced repeatedly to build up spirit of aggressiveness, quick and spontaneous reflexes, Counter ambush drill to include initial response by bringing down heavy volume of fire with help of AGL/CGRL/51Mortar to destabilize entrenched enemy. Clover formation drill can be further improvised - (i) Leading section under attack - Action by middle and rear Section - splitting and taking out flanking move) (ii) Main body under attack - out flanking action by leading and rear sections to attack Ambush site fromflanks) (iii) Rear section under attack - middle and leading section to split and take outflanking move to attack enemy from flanks) - Men to practice counter ambush drill with swiftness, aggressively and noisily.
- XI. Search and destroy operation (SADO) (Troops will be divided in small teams. One PL with two sections up and one section in depth covers an area of 1 km frontage and 1 km in depth No of small teams will be used to search an area. The following contingencies

- will be worked out). (i) Surprise and deception measures - Induction of troops at night - cross country move - Maintaining Radio silence and use of codes - coordination & communication with flanking parties. (ii) Action on locating hide out/camp - organize raid OPS immediately. (iii) Chance encounter - swift offensive and aggressive action. (iv) Hot pursuit - On contact with insurgent, organize hot pursuit. (v) Ex-Hide and seek will be practiced and rehearsed.
- XII. ROP (Strength of ROP could be a team of 30 to 35 Men i.e. a PL strength V formations to be adopted - ROP drill for open terrains and close country - Area up to 400 meters either side of the road to be searched.
- XIII. Laying of naka, frisking/ search of individuals and vehicles
- XIV. Techniques of search - search of house, village and jungle (Parties will be inducted at night to maintain surprise - Area for search to be isolated by laying stops - search may be carried out from Ist light - Communication will be ensured with flanking parties - signal codes to be used - proper reserve will be catered for any contingency) Ex-Hide and Seek will be practiced.
- XV. Cordon and search Ops (CASO) (To ensure surprise and stealth cross country movement of troops at night - legal aspects - availability of police rep.)
- XVI. Evasive movement (Troops will cover a distance of 10-12 kms - They will be practiced to avoid ambush - cross country move - Selection of scouts - men with good observation skill to be selected as scouts and clearing of bounds through fire and move before crossing suspicious areas. Troops to be taught to move with their Back Bent, crouching to make low target to avoid exposure. Bound and obstacle crossing/clearing drills will be practiced.
- XVII. Planning and conduct of raid on hide out/naxal camp. Men will be trained in selection and occupation

of commando base, Sentry silencing techniques approaching enemy sentry (stealthily) - Use of commando dagger - simultaneous silencing of sentries - sufficient reserve - lightening attack and quick disengagement/withdrawal).

- XVIII. Small Team concept (Men to be trained in Prac 04 00 04 18 conducting tactical operations in self contained small teams which are much more effective in jungle warfare than large groups - Small teams to operate in different areas earmarked for them at the same time act as reserve/reinforcement to each other in any contingency co-ordination and communication between various teams). Ex-Hide and Seek will be practiced.
- XVIII. Organization/function of QRT. Troops will be exercised in laying quick and sudden Ambush in areas where militant movement is suspected-Composition of Ambush part and its drill to be practiced.
- XIX. House clearing drill and room intervention (Troops will be taught concept of SWAT Teams - Shooting skills - use of primary and secondary weapons - hostage situation - Room clearing drill - Importance of speed, surprise - and violent action - Use of hand signals - Diversion tactics)

Subject : Field And Battle Craft

- I. Camouflage, concealment and use of ground, movement by day and night. Ex-Observation will be practiced.
- II. Field signal, section and PL formation
- III. Section and PL battle Drill
- IV. Use of Night vision devices and challenging procedure

Subject : Field Engineering

- I. Sabhi prakar ke tenton ke bare mein jankari

- II. Field Engineering aur field fortification ke bare mein jankari
- III. Khudai karne vale aujaaron ki kisme aur unka prayog tatha rakh rakhav.
- IV. Taar ki rukavaton ke bare mein jankari
- V. Fire trench aur weapon pit ko taiyar karne ki jankari.
- VI. Mines ki kisme aur unki visheshtayen
- VII. Trip flair ko lagana aur arm karna.
- VIII. Improvised obstacles -
- IX. (a) Laying Panzies.
(b) Use of Intruder alarm.
(c) Preparation of Tree Machans for observation and better field of fire.
Types and laying of wire obstacles

Explosive and Improvised Explosive Devices

- I. Mechanism and making of demolition set.
- II. Detection handling and neutralization of IEDs
- III. Booby traps, IEDs and type of mines used by Naxals

Subject : Field Firing

- I. Field Firing

Miscellaneous

- I. First Aid and casualty Evacuation
- II. Case studies
- III. Employment of Dogs in insurgency / naxal affected areas
- IV. Opening and closing address
- V. Causes symptoms, remedial and preventive measures of health loss

Subject : Battle Inoculation

- I. Battle inoculation

5.3 Days Self Contained Exercise

- I. Jungle Survival - living off the land

- II. Tactical movement by navigation during day & night. (Listening observation and counting drills along with Bound and obstacle crossing/clearing drills will be practiced).
- III. Camouflage concealment & stalking (Exercise) (This will be done by night - cooked pack food to be given - Troops to be trained in locating tell tale signs - Track pursuit drill - Composition of tracking team. Ex-observation will be practiced & rehearsed as part of this exercise.
- IV. Ex-Harbour & Raid Distribution of narrative, sand model/ Enlargement discussion/briefing by the appointments, on sketch/Xerox copy of Map Preparation for Ops. (All movement will be carried out at night) (Troops will under take two nights approach march covering distance of 30 km) Lying dogo during day - no activity) First night march up to 15 to 20 kms and take Harbour - proper harbour drill to be rehearsed. (No cooking permitted - cooked food split in two meals) (Casualty evacuation drill after end of Raid will be practiced. Actual Raid will be conducted on Day-5. No movement during day. All movement and Ops will take place during night after last the light.)
- V. Ex-Ambush, Counter Ambush Distribution of narrative, sand model/Enlargement discussion briefing by the appointments on sketch/Xerox copy of Map. Preparation for Ops. (All movement will be carried out at night No cooking permitted - Dry/packed food) (Will be conducted as a two way exercise. One team will undertake tactical patrolling and other team to lay Ambush. Separate Teams of instructors will be accompanying both the teams to note down their observations. Team-A will break ambush through counter ambush drill following clover formation and one minute madness drill. After clearing Ambush hot pursuit drill will be practiced

covering 5 to 6 kms distance.)

- VI. Ex seek and Destroy (Troops will under take approach march, covering distance of 10 kms on platoon with two section up and one section in depth) covers 1 km x 1 km area. Distribution of narrative, enlargement/Sand model Discussion/Briefing on sketch/Xerox copy of Map by appointments. Preparation for Ops. (Ex-Hide & Seek will be practiced & rehearsed as part of seek and destroy Ops).

5.4 Syllabus of Elite Forces for Training in The Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare

- I. Drills
- II. SADO
- III. Combat Firing
- IV. ST OPS
- V. RAID
- VI. UAC
- VII. Harbour
- VIII. Intelligence
- IX. Ops Rappelling
- X. Suicidal attacks
- XI. PSY OPS
- XII. Slithering
- XIII. Tracking
- XIV. Interrogation
- XV. Natural Obstacle
- XVI. IED
- XVII. PR & MEDIA
- XVIII. Combat Conditioning
- XIX. Post Security
- XX. Handling Information Population & Resource Control
- XXI. Patrolling
- XXII. MR-Navigation
- XXIII. Target Analysis
- XXIV. ROP

- XXV. Room Intervention
- XXVI. Legal Issues
- XXVII. AMBUSH
- XXVIII. Bus Intervention
- XXIX. Stress Management
- XXX. CASO
- XXXI. Convoy
- XXXII. Human Rights
- XXXIII. Large Scale Operations
- XXXIV. MCP & QRT
- XXXV. Civic Action Projects

Outdoor Exercises & Demonstrations

Outdoor Exercises

- I. Harbour in jungles
- II. Trekking
- III. IEDs.
- IV. Security of posts
- V. Patrolling o ROP
- VI. Convoy Protection
- VII. Civic action
- VIII. Surveillance
- IX. Source cultivation
- X. SADO
- XI. House Clearing
- XII. CASO
- XIII. Room Intervention
- XIV. Bus Intervention
- XV. Embussing - Debussing
- XVI. MCP, QRT, RAID

Demonstrations

- I. Jungle Survival
- II. IEDs
- III. Convoy Protection
- IV. Ambush
- V. CASO of Room Intervention

VI. Bus Intervention

VII. MCP, Raid

- Advanced Techniques of Scientific Investigations
- VIP Security
- Insurgency/Terrorism
- Detection & Disposal of Bombs/Explosives
- Computer Applications
- Management/Public Administration
- Forensic Science
- Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
- Dealing with special crimes
- Drugs/Narcotics
- Training of Trainers
- Human Rights
- Radio/Wireless
- Traffic
- Commando Training
- Intelligence
- Rock Climbing
- Cyber Crimes
- Field Craft/Tactics

Source: Extracts from data from BPR&D published in Police Organization in India by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2008.

5.5 Training Methodology

The training methodology which is being adopted in the Country now for imparting police training in LWE areas is not up to the mark. The training right now is modelled on regimental military style emphasizing on timing, uniformity and adherence to the set ritualistic and ceremonial procedures rather than understanding the purpose of the instructions given. Unless the constables understand the very purpose of the drill, discipline as well as the exercises to follow it will be impossible for them to appreciate the training. Since they are not the constables to be posted else where and they have to concentrate on the LWE tactics alone, they must understand

the purpose of each tactics and each strategy. The training methodology, hence, must include the above in the very pattern of teaching whether it is chalk and talk method, a case study method, panel discussion method or whether it is other psycho analytical methods. It depends on the type of Course that is offered. There shall not be one uniform methodology for treating all the subjects.

Even though indoor subjects can have the chalk and talk method, it is suggested that objective choices etc. should be given in order to make the trainers remember the most important elements of the indoor subjects. If there is any superficial differences between the indoor and outdoor subjects it will not be useful for imparting the training based on that, the reason being that indoors and outdoors are so intrinsically inter-related in LWE teaching methodology that one cannot do any significant partitioning between these two.

The trainees should be given exposure through internet for accessing the best of the training materials available in different parts of the world on the particular subjects. For example on combat skills, the US military academies have got a plethora of subjects available on the internet and so is it on subjects like Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The trainees should have access to the latest Information Communication Technologies (ICTs).

Since the quality of the trainers is generally poor as they do not themselves understand the importance of ICTs, this aspect must be taken into consideration before posting of any body into these new areas of training.

It has been found out by the BPR&D study that out of 100 Police Training Institutions, 23 of them are functioning without classrooms, 18 of them without blackboards, 16 of them without any overhead projectors, 57 of the under training police training institutions do not have any conference room, 76 of them do not have any seminar rooms or assembly halls, 20 of them i.e. 1/5 of them do not have any library, 70% of them do not have any auditoriums and 93 of them are without any simulation facilities. In other words 95 of them do not have

any forensic facilities, 72 of them are without any computer facilities and 04 are without any lavatory facilities. This shows the kind of attention that is being given to police training. Unless these infrastructural lacuna is set right, no worthwhile training can be imparted to an Elite Force.

5.6 Evaluation Methodology of Training Imparted

- I. For evaluation methodology, emphasis should be more on grasping of the fundamentals rather than sticking to some statistical details. For this, domain experts of the field should be asked to first interact with the trainees and know the level of their grasping and then only conduct the examinations, rather than conducting the examinations after assuming that the level of teaching was done according to the domain experts view. It is a fact that a majority of the training institutions suffer from paucity of talented teachers.
- II. Since the entire scheme is on team work, testing should be done on team efforts for checking leadership qualities as well as follower ship qualities.
- III. Emphasis should be more on situation analysis and spontaneous response.
- IV. Emphasis should also be on capability to first grasp . Because it is basic principle to understand first and then only brief.
- V. There should be thorough and transparent discussion on case studies. Here people should be encouraged to give their opinion also, rather than sticking to the position given by the teacher.

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